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Summary

DOCTORAL THESIS

International Interventions after 9/11 terrorist attacks

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INTRODUCTION

The contemporary world is characterised by a diversity and complexity unprecedented in history, generated by the **great transformations and mutations** taking place on all levels: political, economic, social, technical and scientific, which trigger major changes in the power relations in the current international system. All these changes in turn have specific characteristics for relations between states and international life as a whole, bringing to the fore **phenomena and events that need to be understood in order to find appropriate solutions** so that the security and progress of peoples can be ensured.

Leaders must constantly reassess the forces shaping the global environment. These forces are both resilient and dynamic, representing continuity and change at the same time. Strategists must understand the international security environment and make decisions about **how to proceed but also continually reassess ways and means to achieve interests**. A strategy based on false, outdated or erroneous assumptions and conclusions about how the world works is doomed to failure.

In scientific research and academic debate, as well as in political practice, international interventions are considered to be military interventions, and the controversy surrounding this concept focuses on whether they are 'good' or 'bad', developing towards just war or humanitarian interventions.

This research goes into detail and puts the magnifying glass on the myriad of concepts it relates to practice. The paper sets out a structuring of international interventions since 2001, an evolution of practice in this field, as well as an ongoing scholarly debate on interpretations of related concepts, and proposes an analytical matrix that aims to synthesise the description of international intervention through indicators.

1. HYPOTHESIS, OBJECTIVES AND USEFULNESS OF THE RESEARCH

The research on the types of interventionism after September 11, 2001 finds its **meaning and usefulness** in proposing an **analysis of the practices** of international interventions, with the aim of showing as complete and synthetic a picture as possible of the interactions in the contemporary international world.

By **abstracting the tools** used and **the way in which they are accessed**, we arrive at a **model of analysis**, a matrix of the evaluation of contemporary interventions that shows what the evolution of an intervention will be and what the specificities of a given international interventionist actor are, implicitly **what its possibilities are for launching an international intervention and what the major lines of the intervention's evolution are**.

The **research hypothesis** is shaped by the question of whether international interventionist actors act on the basis of common rules, based on the realities of intervention, or whether they diversify their intervention modalities according to developments in the international security environment and the existing world order at a given time (the scheme, power relations and rules of the international system).

Determinism ends up being on both sides and thus interventionist actors can change the balance of power in the international system through international intervention.

The **need to understand** the interventionist profile of actors falling into this category is demonstrated by the need to find the best solutions in order to predict and prevent certain undesirable developments.

John Zametica made this point very pertinently in a paper published at the International Institute for Strategic Studies: *“As long as the international community, inclined towards goodwill, continues to become increasingly involved in conflict zones around the world, its main weapon must be knowledge.”*¹

Hannah Arendt pointed out that, *“Predictions of the future are never anything but projections of automatic processes and procedures in the present, that is, they are events which are likely to occur unless people act and unless something unexpected happens; every action, for better or worse, and every accident necessarily destroy the whole pattern into which the prediction fits and from which it draws its evidence”*.²

So, by following the processes and procedures already in use, you come to describe a pattern of behaviour, identify a series of specific tools used by a particular actor and come, in cases where the unexpected is not dominant, to be able to design courses of action and ways of intervention.

The **main objective of the research** is to analyse the situations that determine the emergence of international interventions, how they are carried out, following a series of defining indicators of interventions - motivation, justification, tools used and methods applied, with the aim of highlighting the types of interventionism and specific behaviours of international actors.

The **motivation** behind this research is on the one hand the effervescence and structural changes in international interventions after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and on the other hand the need to develop an analytical model, with abstracted indicators, that captures the defining elements of contemporary interventionism.

The pace of events at the global level has become fast and very difficult to follow, with a great deal of detail and a high degree of innovation. So we need simple matrices to keep up with the pace of reality.

2. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH PAPER

Chapter I contains the theories, concepts and general theoretical framework that help to understand the argumentative thread of the research.

It sets out the discussion of **military interventions**, moving gradually to **security interventions**, explained using the Copenhagen School paradigm and the extension of the concept of security.

It also exposes the evolution of the notion of **sovereignty** and the many transformations and interpretations that have occurred over time. The concept of sovereignty is closely linked to international interventions, it represents the limit of their manifestation and gives substance to the legitimacy to intervene. We move from Westphalian sovereignty to the interpretation of

¹ John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 33.

² Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 6.

sovereignty as responsibility, a theoretical context that explains a wide range of international interventions and defines the approach to the need and justification for intervention.

On the other hand, it also includes a **discussion of legality and morality**, two other essential elements in the discussion of interventionism. When is international intervention allowed and under what pretexts?

In international practice, a new concept has emerged as a norm, the "**responsibility to protect**", which will be found in the case studies in various forms. Its importance in this research paper is precisely because it operationalises the discussion of sovereignty as responsibility and also encompasses the focus on human security when analysing international interventions, going beyond the exclusivity of the state level.

What surrounds us operates according to a set of rules, the global game unfolds in an environment characterised by certain particularities of the moment, by risks, threats and vulnerabilities, by relations of power and cooperation, which ultimately define an all-encompassing world order. In **Chapter II, *Global order and the international security environment after 11 September 2001***, we have presented this context of international reality during the period under study.

In order to underline the dynamic nature of international developments I have also described a number of future projections of global political arrangements and power relations.

The geopolitical context gives nuances to the behaviour of international actors and is an important component in explaining the interventionist phenomenon.

The beginning of the 21st century is marked by profound transformations in the security environment. The world is becoming increasingly complex and interdependent, and the phenomenon of globalisation is becoming increasingly irreversible. The security environment of the 21st century is characterised by substantial transformations, requiring adaptation of the classical criteria for analysing international security.

The main post-World War II developments in international interventions to ensure peace and stability and protect human rights have included the formation of the United Nations and regional organisations such as NATO, as well as ad hoc "voluntary coalitions". These developments coincided with the spread of globalisation and international agreements governing many aspects of modern life, including arms control, human rights, war crimes, environmental protection, finance and communications.

For a comprehensive analysis of international interventions after 2001, it is necessary to detail the systemic conditions that are an important constraint or determinant on the behaviour of states and the dynamics of relations between them.

New security challenges, generated by the overlapping of phenomena such as globalisation and fragmentation, add to classic forms of regional risks and vulnerabilities. Traditional hotbeds of tension remain, but their development is intrinsically influenced by the emergence of unconventional and cross-border risks such as terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some groupings of states have entered a post-industrial stage of development, while others are in a period of political and economic transition towards modernity. In some regions, the number of 'fragile' societies has increased and so has their inability to control developments on their national territories.

Stanley Hoffman considered that "the present system is marked by a specific combination of resilience and fragility", a characteristic that makes it resemble balance of

power systems. However, the differences exist, in the latter "resilience was provided by the ability of the balance mechanism to moderate ambitions and conflicts, and fragility resulted from the existence of sovereignty: a jungle of ambitions that were not curbed by a greater power."³

Currently the power structure is characterised by diversity, so that the system is vertically fragmented into partially separate arenas, each with its own hierarchy of players. Moreover, Hoffman also sees the current international system as fundamentally unique, stemming from several factors: Structural heterogeneity of the system - the existence of different international structures corresponding to different types of power (military, monetary, economic) or the impact of geopolitical diversity; competition on a global scale - the rivalry of the major powers, as well as persistent rivalries or configurations at the local level that can be used by the major powers for their competition (so that the major powers have the ability to absorb and mix all other major conflicts into their conflict); the nature and multiplicity of constraints - some resulting from risks of reckless action, others from common rules and procedures (international regimes); the dynamic density of relationships that increases system ambiguity; the horizontal fragmentation of power into a variety of subsystems.

The political order is not a stable equilibrium. Ideological dominance, political supremacy and strategic behaviour have the potential to affect existing international norms. Shifts in the balance of power have occurred during periods of disruption of international norms.

Having explained the realities of the period under study and the trends for the future, in **Chapter III** we set out the case studies, for 5 international actors, captured in 16 case studies, in the period after 11 September 2001.

Over all of these, we apply the **analysis matrix**, a simplified analysis model that tracks the essential components of an international intervention and shows the evolution of the interventionist phenomenon as well as specific behavioural patterns of interventionist actors.

Extrapolated in a more technical language, this matrix represents the lines of code of an algorithm of contemporary interventionism.

In the case of non-state actors, international organisations, we have analysed the **United Nations, NATO and the European Union**.

The Security Council is the central body that coordinates international interventions. To describe the methods and instruments used, the UN Charter has concrete measures and actions to define what is allowed and what is not. Furthermore, the resolutions issued by the UN contain, for each individual case, the precise course of action and mandate, regardless of the type of action or whether it is conducted directly by the UN or by other member states, alliances, regional structures or coalitions of the willing, with the exception of Resolution 1373.

The validity of the interventions authorised by the UN lies precisely in the legitimacy and universality of the international organisation, and their justification is contained in the defence of human rights, the protection of civilians, the defence of world peace and the assurance of international security, the basic principles of the UN.

³ Stanley Hoffmann, "Viitorul sistemului politic internațional: o schiță. Gânduri asupra schimbării," în *Ianus și Minerva. Eseuri asupra teoriei și practicii politicii internaționale*, ed. Stanley Hoffmann (Chișinău: Editura Știința, 1999, 113.

Of course, the literature on the UN's missions and the evolution of the organisation as an international body central to the world order contains many analyses based on different assumptions. In line with the references already made in the paper to the selectivity of interventions, a combination of four factors can be discerned that explain whether the UN takes (or does not take) firm action (sanctions, peacekeeping operations, military action) in response to a humanitarian crisis. The first factor is the extent of human suffering in a crisis. In a humanitarian crisis, people suffer while human rights norms are massively violated. This generates **morally motivated** pressure to come to the aid of threatened populations and to defend international norms;

Secondly, UN intervention depends on **the extent to which a crisis spreads** to neighbouring regions or states. Humanitarian crises usually affect neighbouring regions or states in negative ways. These effects include **regional diffusion of conflict, waves of refugees, terrorism or economic slowdown**. These effects create a **material interest to intervene**.

The third factor is **the ability of a state to resist outside intervention**. Militarily strong states or states with strong allies can **raise the risks and costs of a UN intervention and hurt its chances of success**.

Fourth and finally, UN interventions can be explained by the **level of material and reputational resources that the UN has allocated** in the past to resolving a crisis. **The time, money and diplomatic prestige** invested by the UN in resolving a crisis leads to a desire to **protect these investments through continued and increasing involvement**.

The UN is expected to take firm action - coercive measures include economic sanctions, peacekeeping operations or (authorising) military action(s) - if a humanitarian crisis (in terms of casualties or refugees) expands and the organisation has allocated substantial resources to its resolution. However, this only leads to intervention when the crisis generates enough negative effects (e.g. waves of refugees) or when the state being intervened in is weak and therefore unable to resist outside intervention.

Using the *War on Terror* and the wars in Afghanistan as justification, the military specialists' rationale for a **global role for NATO** has begun to take shape and has been debated in various scholarly works.

The activation, for the first time, of Article 5 shows us that this is possible, makes the guarantor of collective security tangible and thus strengthens the credibility of the Alliance.

According to military specialists: *"The concept of a global NATO is used mainly in connection with two main motivations - on the one hand, the idea of becoming a global strategic actor (functional globalisation) and, on the other, the notion of a NATO whose membership is, in principle, worldwide (institutional globalisation). The two dimensions can, however, with difficulty, be separated from each other, but are instead interconnected".*⁴

NATO therefore has the necessary motivation to include various forms of interventionism in its programmatic documents and in its practice in order to have the leverage to remain a relevant actor in the contemporary security environment and in the future.

⁴ Robert Rush, *Multinational Operations, Alliances and International Military Cooperation - Past and Future* (Washington: Center of Military History, 2006).

In November 2003, NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, stated that "*NATO is a problem solver*".⁵ I think this was the most important and shortest definition of NATO, a simple explanation that could be the solution to reinvigorate the mission of the North Atlantic Organization at any time.

Analysing the two cases, we understand that NATO intervention is a necessity. The problem is the legal basis and the introduction of intervention criteria into its planning processes. NATO could therefore consider developing formal intervention criteria to determine when to intervene, whether in the case of an enlarged Europe or anywhere in the world.

NATO is developing its response mechanisms and helping to reinforce the principle of the responsibility to protect. Intervention under the "responsibility to protect" was originally envisaged in the case of a failed state⁶, if the state was unable or unwilling to protect its civilian population. However, only conflicts caused by the four mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing⁷) could justify activating the "responsibility to protect" principle⁸. The case of Libya was an extreme situation, of a state attacking its own population, which triggered an immediate and **pre-emptive response**.

As military forces, under Gaddafi's direct orders, stepped up their attacks on civilians, the political opposition appealed to the international community to urgently establish an embargo/air blockade to mitigate and prevent the bloodshed with which the dictator was threatening his people.

The official reaction of the international community, including the UN Security Council, through Resolution 1973, contributed, through the intervention of international military forces, to preventing the massacre of the Libyan people by the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi.

NATO's 2011 humanitarian military intervention in Libya has been hailed as a model for the implementation of the emerging 'responsibility to protect' norm, on the grounds that it prevented bloodshed in Benghazi and facilitated the removal of Libya's oppressive leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, who targeted peaceful civilian protesters.

There has also been much criticism of this model of intervention. Alan J. Kuperman argues, in a 2013 article, that the conventional narrative is flawed in its description of both the nature of violence in Libya prior to the intervention and the ultimate goal of external intervention, regime change.⁹

⁵ "*The Role of NATO in the 21st Century*," speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson at the "Welt am Sonntag Forum," NATO, NATO Speeches (November 03, 2003), <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031103a.htm>.

⁶ Andrew Engel, *Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options*, (Washington: The Washington Institute, November, 2014).

⁷ Alex Bellamy, *Responsibility to protect* (Cambridge and Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2009).

⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, "2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1," October 24, 2005, Articles 138-139,

https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf.

⁹ Alan J. Kuperman, *Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene*, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Policy Brief, September 2013.

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene>.

Looking at the EU's security and defence work, with a new security strategy after more than a decade, mechanisms for deeper defence cooperation, evolving discussions about complementarity with NATO and talk of strategic autonomy, Europe is moving towards increased global relevance.

The prerequisites for a European army with exclusive manpower are not being laid down, but rather, through well-defined cooperation instruments, working methods, enhanced interoperability and standardisation, a Europe is emerging that could defend itself more effectively against new present and future threats.

In practice, all these steps point to reactive behaviour, with the EU being pushed towards this path by the changing security environment. The relevance of the European Union as an actor on the international stage is also measured by its ability to ensure the security of its citizens, even if the European project started from economic deals.

The emergence of these debates at European level is creating a new approach to defence and the projection of stability in the EU's neighbourhood. What is certain is that there is a move towards an EU-wide commitment to security and defence.

From the perspective of this research in the case of the European Union, one can follow a logical evolutionary thread of shaping a type of interventionism, moving away from one based on diplomacy, the use of rules and economic constraints towards one that includes the security and military domains.

It is interesting to note that, in the case of the EU, the chances are that the process will be the reverse, moving from the 'soft' to the 'hard' side of interventionism, whereas in the case of the other players we first identify the military instrument, to which are added the other 'soft' or 'hybrid' instruments.

So far, looking at European missions in the world, international intervention has been very well regulated, but also restrictive and selective.

In the case of state actors, we have selected for research the hegemon of the system - the United States of America and the revisionist power, the Russian Federation.

International interventions in the case of the hegemon - the USA

A 2016 study, published in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, analysing US military interventions from 1981-2005, found that the US engages in military interventions most likely for humanitarian reasons, focusing on the protection of human rights, rather than for its own security interests, focusing on promoting democracy or reducing terrorism.¹⁰

Since 2001, the most important component of the *War on Terror* has been direct military intervention. This decision to confront terrorism using armed force, rather than through a more traditional law enforcement framework, has significantly shaped the *War on Terror* and helped determine its outcomes.

Although they have taken various forms, the primary goals of US military interventions - direct and indirect - have remained constant from 2001 to the present. First and foremost, the purpose of military intervention has been to eliminate terrorists, to destroy their organisations and to eliminate their ability to organise terrorist actions. Critical to this strategy was the belief

¹⁰ Seung-Whan Choi, and Patrick James, "Why Does the United States Intervene Abroad? Democracy, Human Rights Violations, and Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 5 (August 2016): 899–926. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714560350>.

that the United States could not wait until the threat became a major one. Instead, the United States began to strike **preemptively**. Beginning with the 2002 *National Security Strategy*, the Bush administration advanced a doctrine of preemptive action against terrorist threats, even if those threats were not imminent.¹¹ According to reporter Bob Woodward, "*many in the Bush administration felt that President Clinton's responses to the terrorist attacks were weak, thus encouraging terrorists*".¹² Instead, the Bush administration has put the United States on an offensive trajectory, seeking to defeat and destroy terrorist groups overseas so that, in President Bush's words, "we don't have to face them in America."¹³

It is important to note that the election of Barack Obama has provoked minute moves at the strategic level. In addition to continuing to fight the Taliban and other jihadist groups in Afghanistan, and alongside major efforts against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the United States, during the Obama administration, has launched drone strikes, airstrikes and special forces operations in Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen.¹⁴ It is true that President Obama withdrew US troops from Iraq, a move that was later criticised for allowing the rise of ISIS. But this was not inconsistent with the Bush administration's approach. In the Status of Forces Agreement signed with Iraq in 2008, President Bush pledged to withdraw all US troops by 2011.¹⁵

Buoyed by a perceived early success in promoting democracy in Afghanistan, President Bush has frequently stated his belief that America has a **responsibility to liberate peoples**. In 2003, President Bush announced what he called a "*progressive strategy for liberating the Middle East*".¹⁶ After the first elections in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush stepped up his calls for democracy in the Middle East, promoting it as the cornerstone of the War on Terror.¹⁷ Bush believed that **democracy could provide the transformation needed to diminish the conditions that support terrorism** and solve the problem of extremist Islamism.¹⁸ National strategy documents promulgated by both the Bush and Obama administrations have identified that **promoting democracy may be the long-term solution in the fight against terror and the best way to achieve lasting security for the US**.¹⁹

Beyond regime change and democratisation, the United States has used reconstruction aid as a key tool in winning the region.

¹¹ "The National Security Strategy," White House, President George W. Bush, September 20, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

¹² Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).

¹³ George W. Bush, "Remarks at the American Legion National Convention in Reno, Nevada," August 28, 2007, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75688>.

¹⁴ Micah Zenko, *Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), 8, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/12/Drones_CSR65.pdf

¹⁵ "Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq," White House, President George W. Bush, November 27, 2008, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081127-2.html>.

¹⁶ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 88.

¹⁷ Raphael Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. November 23, 2005, 4. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA444930.pdf>.

¹⁸ Lee Hamilton, and Justine A. Rosenthal, *State of the struggle: report on the battle against global terrorism*, Washington, D.C.: Council on Global Terrorism, 2006, 83.

¹⁹ Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 148–49. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499>.

It is difficult to understand the situation in Iraq or other interventions in the Middle East without a broader context in which, in the post-Cold War era and in the midst of globalisation, the hegemon is accused of imperialism.

Ronald Robinson's concept of an empire as a system in which war sets in motion predominantly economic instruments enabling the sustainable exploitation of peripheral states and Douglas Stokes' consideration that the US empire has two 'engines', one state-centred and one transnational, are fairly comprehensive explanations for the Iraq war.²⁰

One of the main components of realism, that unchecked power will be used to excess, suggests that a strong imperialist tendency is embedded in hegemony and that the possible malign effects of excessive hegemonic power cannot be neglected; as Robert Jervis argues, *"the fact that states continue on the path of moderation when they are not forced to do so is the exception rather than the rule. But can a hegemon be forced to be moderate?"*²¹

Indeed, benign hegemony arguably requires special conditions: a secondary power (Soviet Union/Russian Federation) that constrains the hegemonic power and gives the hegemon the motivation to maximize its own coalition by tempering its own ambitions and dominating foreign policy established by pragmatic realists, not ideologues²² or special interests.

Given claims that US intervention in Iraq has produced a "legitimacy crisis" for the UN Security Council²³ and the US administration²⁴, this episode makes an interesting case for the study of legitimacy.

Legitimacy, as "ownership, of a rule or rule-making institution, which exerts a pull towards compliance for those to whom it is normatively addressed"²⁵, is not an absolute structural constraint on the behaviour of international actors.

Since the majority of states were, however, complying with these legitimate rules, the behaviour of the US was considered illegitimate by both the Security Council and the international community²⁶. In itself, this illegitimate behaviour is not surprising as the material means ultimately determine the *"maximum limits of possible activity"* of any state.²⁷ Thus,

²⁰ Ronald Robinson, "Imperial theory and the question of imperialism after empire," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12, no. 2 (1984): 45-54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03086538408582659>; Doug Stokes, "The heart of empire? Theorizing US empire in an era of transnational capitalism," *Third World Quarterly* no. 2 (August 2005): 217-236. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000339092>.

²¹ Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 365-388. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30035780>.

²² Raymond Hinnebusch, "Hegemonic Stability Theory reconsidered: implications of the Iraq war," In *The Iraq War: Causes and consequences*, ed. Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, 283-322. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Press, 2006.

²³ Justin Morris, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force," *International Politics* 44, no. 2-3 (February 2007), 214. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800185>.

²⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2-3 (March 2007): 164. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800182>.

²⁵ Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16.

²⁶ Robert W. Tucker, and David C. Hendrickson, "The Sources of American Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004): 14. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20034134>.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 111.

the US, being a powerful state and possessing the ability to absorb the inherent costs of illegitimate behaviour, is not on an equal footing with other states in terms of legitimacy²⁸.

However, as Hurd observes, it would not be fair for the US to be treated, despite its material power, differently in terms of the **ideational structures of legitimate norms** in international society²⁹. In the end, *"legitimate norms constrain even the most powerful actors"*³⁰.

We have observed that the US will not hesitate to act alone to protect its interests, but nevertheless the US administration felt it had to defend its actions before the Security Council. In fact, the US administration has shown a *"willingness to incur significant losses in terms of time, political compromise and compensation"*³¹ in trying to secure Security Council authorisation for its actions. However, the US administration has not, in fact, experienced the process of coming to terms with the idea that Security Council authorisation was absolutely essential prior to the use of force³².

This is evident both in the circumvention of the Security Council by the United States and in the prevailing view within the US administration that the Security Council could be bypassed on the basis of domestic legitimacy. As John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, has stated, *"Our actions, executed in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, do not require separate external validation to make them legitimate."*³³

Yet the United States has behaved as if the international legitimacy of UN Security Council approval for the use of military force was important. However, while this legitimate norm was of no interest to the US administration, the US knew that other states had bought into the idea that the only body that could *"provide the only legitimacy necessary to act in Iraq"*³⁴ was the Security Council. From a rational perspective, the US understood that failure to obtain UN authorisation for intervention would entail costs, including a possible loss of its own legitimacy, since other states were adamantly complying with Security Council authority.

Thus, the existence of a legitimate rule regarding UN authorisation of the use of military force indirectly (if only initially) constrained the United States, even though the US administration had not appropriated that rule in this case.

²⁸Vincent Charles Keating, "The Legitimacy of American Human rights Conduct in the War on Terror," (PhD Thesis, Aberystwyth University, 2011), 232.

²⁹Ian Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008): 209. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800184>.

³⁰Justin Morris, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force," *International Politics* 44, no. 2-3 (February 2007): 214-231. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800185>.

³¹Lavina Rajendram Lee, *US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars on Iraq* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 152.

³²Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 124-125.

³³John R. Bolton, "«Legitimacy» in International Affairs: The American Perspective. Theory and Operation," Remarks to the Federalist Society, U.S. Department of State Archive, November 13, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/26143.htm>.

³⁴"Annan warns US over Iraq," *BBC News*, September 11, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2250948.stm.

One method by which the legitimacy of international norms and principles can be measured is the **"study of exceptions"**³⁵: **whether international actors feel compelled, when they appear to be breaking the rules, to justify their actions as being within accepted normative limits.** Under this principle, it is fundamental to assess that the US administration did not have a strategy of openly violating legitimate international norms. Instead, the United States felt compelled to pursue a **"legitimizing strategy" of justifying its actions in accordance with legitimate norms interpreted "correctly."** ³⁶

Therefore, despite applying a new strategy of (essentially) **unilateral preventive war** that was considered illegitimate by the international community in terms of the norms of the use of military force, the United States felt obliged to ensure the legitimacy of its own behaviour through legal justifications. In the absence of explicit UN authorisation for the use of force, this **justification strategy** manifested itself in repeated assertions by the US administration that they in fact **wished to enforce previous Security Council resolutions.** Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that *"this war is being waged under the authority of UN Resolutions 1441, 678 and 687" and therefore "this war has international authority"*.³⁷

Of course, this legitimising strategy led to a creative interpretation of these earlier resolutions since, technically, they did not authorise the use of military force, despite calls for Iraq's disarmament. However, this strategic use of legitimate norms³⁸, illustrated the US realisation that there was indeed a legitimate norm within international society whereby the use of military force depended on authorisation by a UN Security Council Resolution.

Another obvious example was the proving of the idea that **military force can legitimately be used**, at least by the United States, to **"change a regime" in order to secure its own long-term security interests.** This attempt at innovation affected both the legitimate use of military force embodied in the UN Charter and the core principles of the Westphalian system.

Therefore, as a **"norm developer"**³⁹ attempting to legitimise illegitimate regime change, the US has been forced to bundle its actions with other **legitimate moral norms based on humanitarian rationales.**

Specifically, this involved promoting the idea that removing Saddam Hussein from power and imposing a democratic regime in Iraq was legitimate because, in President Bush's words, *"creating a stable and unified regime in a free Iraq"* ⁴⁰ would free the Iraqi people from *"the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them"*. In the months leading up to

³⁵Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 391. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550913>.

³⁶Morris, J., Wheeler, N.J., Egerton, F. and Keating, V. (2009) *The Rise and Fall of Norms in International Relations* (Aberystwyth: International Security and Institutions Research Group, FCO), p. 2.

³⁷Colin L. Powell, "Interview on Abu Dhabi TV," U.S. Department of State Archive, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19070.htm>

³⁸Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 65. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801551414>.

³⁹Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 896. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361>.

⁴⁰George W. Bush, "President George W. Bush Speaks at AEI's Annual Dinner," American Enterprise Institute (AEI), February 28, 2003, <https://www.aei.org/research-products/speech/president-george-w-bush-speaks-at-aeis-annual-dinner/>.

the invasion, also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush reiterated that while the basic idea was to disarm Iraq, "**liberating the Iraqi people**" was "*an important moral reason*".⁴¹

Moreover, the US administration highlighted the Hussein regime's unbearable domestic behaviour against its own population⁴². In line with this idea, the discovery, during the invasion, of the regime's victims in mass graves was emphasised by the US in its appeal to a **moral source of legitimacy**.⁴³

The concept of legitimacy helps explain why the US sought the consensus of a **democratic coalition of the willing** to invade Iraq. First, it should be noted that the United States has the financial capability to act unilaterally to pursue its interests. As Kagan points out, "*militarily, it can and does act alone*"⁴⁴, a case reflected in the fact that the US contributed 85% of the troops involved in the Iraq war.⁴⁵

In any case, acting within the coalition involved certain logistical problems in terms of interoperability, thus creating an obstacle to effective coordination of operations.

Therefore, individualistic considerations of non-division of effort provide an inadequate explanation for the US decision to proceed with the somewhat multilateral invasion. A more convincing explanation lies in the notion that the US administration, from a rational perspective, respected the benefits of legitimising its own actions internationally, and understood that unilateral action, without the agreement of a "**social body of legitimacy**"⁴⁶, could not be considered just and legitimate.

The US sought to portray the idea that "*democratic consensus... would be more important than general international consensus*"⁴⁷ by suggesting that a **select group of states, validated as democratic and liberal**, could constitute an appropriate social body for legitimizing the use of force. "*Legitimacy constrains and mandates*"⁴⁸ international actors.

In sum, the existence of legitimate norms and principles in international society exerted, even indirectly, a certain influence on US behaviour up to and during the 2003 Iraq intervention.

Hurd argues that once a **legitimate norm is "distributed in society, this belief changes the decision-making environment for all actors, even those who have not appropriated that**

⁴¹George W. Bush, "George Bush's speech to the UN general assembly," *The Guardian*, September 12, 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/12/iraq.usa3>.

⁴²Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 223.

⁴³Rick Fawn, "The Iraq War: Unfolding and Unfinished," in *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Rick Fawn, and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Press, 2006), 15.

⁴⁴Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March-April, 2004): 82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033903>.

⁴⁵Stephen Zunes, "The United States: Belligerent Hegemon," in *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Rick Fawn, and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Press, 2006), 21.

⁴⁶Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2-3 (March 2007): 164. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800182>.

⁴⁷Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 186.

⁴⁸Lavina Rajendram Lee, *US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars on Iraq* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 19.

rule, because it affects everyone's expectations about the possible behavior of other players."

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In the cases of interventions in Syria or Yemen, US involvement is more along the lines of indirect intervention through sectoral aid. Another practical model is that of **intervention by invitation**, as we observed in the case of Yemen or Iraq (2014).

A much different intervention from those that the US supported during the period under study is the 1994 humanitarian intervention in Haiti, authorised by the UN Security Council, which was initiated in response to a human rights situation that bears little resemblance to the acceptance of the term "genocide" or other equivalent abuses.⁵⁰

However, if the intervention in Haiti provides a standard for humanitarian interventions, then the lack of a democratically elected government and the daily brutalities that are its consequences should be sufficient to justify the use of force.

Like the debate about motives, the **concept of 'trigger conditions'** for humanitarian intervention is the subject of intense debate in academia. Michael Reisman, professor of law at Yale University, is among those who argue that under international law there is **a right to use armed force to overthrow despotic governments in other states**.⁵¹

International interventions in the case of a revisionist power - Russia

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation over the past two decades has brought into question several phases, starting with a clear opposition to the status quo before the events of September 2001, followed by a flirtation with alliance with the West in the fight against terror, and continuing with a fierce struggle to reassert and re-establish the empire, which is also seen as a revisionist foreign policy.

Over time, after multiple clashes, it can be seen that Russia is not absent from the scene of confrontations and always finds claims, ways of intrusion, ways of intervention, in an aggressive and determined tone.

At the 42nd Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin used harsh language to challenge the existing pattern of Russia's relations with the West, which he said had been in place since the end of the Cold War⁵². Putin's main claim was that **the West, especially the United States, had not taken Russia's views and interests into account. Putin criticised general issues, such as the US ambition to build a unipolar world order and lack of commitment to arms control, as well as specific issues, such as NATO**

⁴⁹Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 7.

⁵⁰Colin Granderson, "Military-Humanitarian Ambiguities in Haiti," in *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Jonathan Moore (Oxford, Eng.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 99-118.

⁵¹Michael W. Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4)," *American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 3 (July 1984): 642-645. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2202601>. Anthony D'Amato, "The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny," *American Journal of International Law* 84, no. 2 (April 1990): 516-524. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2203464>. Vezi și Simon Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 88-111. Pentru o viziune opusă, vezi Oscar Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion," *American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 3 (July 1984): 645-650. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2202602>.

⁵²Russian Perspective, "Putin's landmark speech at the Munich Security Conference," September 29, 2007, 9:52, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlY5aZfOgPA>.

expansion and the development of its anti missile shield.⁵³ Putin's message to transatlantic listeners was that Russia no longer accepted the existing international order.

Caught in a realist foreign policy mindset and obsessed with the fear of being surrounded by enemies⁵⁴, the Kremlin sees hard-power control of the former Soviet republics as a guarantee of its own border security.

Like Georgia, Russia has used hard power to ensure its strategic military presence in Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea, justified in the name of defending ethnic Russians living there, is in fact aimed at securing Russia's military presence on the peninsula. Vladimir Putin has made it clear that the seizure of Crimea was **"necessary to prevent Russia from being virtually removed from the Black Sea area" and to prevent NATO ships from being anchored in Sevastopol.** To avoid this danger, Russia had to "react accordingly"⁵⁵. Maintaining the military base was the main motivation. The Crimean peninsula occupies a strategic position in the Black Sea, practically in the middle of it, which gives considerable advantages both for the deployment of ships and air forces.

In the 'near neighbourhood' Russia has had the easiest task in maintaining its military bases in Armenia and Belarus. The small Caucasian republic hosts two Russian military facilities: a base in Gyumri, and a small air base in Yerevan.⁵⁶

The most difficult cases in maintaining a military presence in the 'near neighbourhood' have been in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. In the three countries where it has established frozen conflicts, Russia has secured its military bases by using hard power means: supporting secessionist wars (in Moldova - Transnistria), invading the sovereign country (in Georgia) or officially violating the territorial integrity of a neighbouring state (in Ukraine). In all these cases, Moscow has justified its actions **by protecting the rights of ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics and the need to protect its borders from NATO's advance into the "sphere of privileged interests"**.

Russia has built its Crimean legitimisation discourse on a series of international law arguments that it reinterprets and mimics Western rhetoric. The legality of the Ukrainian peninsula's independence process, the right to self-determination of the local population and the humanitarian factor based on the potential threat to the lives of Crimean residents⁵⁷ have been the central models of justification for the Kremlin's rhetoric.

Through the strategy of frozen conflict, Russia seeks to use - or create, through ethnic cleansing in the case of Georgia - Russian minorities or territorial claims to occupy portions of its neighbours' territories. Russia then uses the resulting conflict to intimidate the occupied state and other states in the region, while - precisely because it is part of the problem - demanding a

⁵³*Ibidem.*

⁵⁴Vasile Rotaru, *The Eastern Partnership. A turning point in EU-Russia relations?* (București: Military Publishing House, 2014), 97.

⁵⁵ "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin," President of Russia, Events, April 17, 2014. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796>.

⁵⁶ Gevorg Melikyan, "The dynamics of military basing in South Caucasus," in *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*, ed. Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009), 190.

⁵⁷Vasile Rotaru, "Russia's Post-Crimea Legitimization Discourse and its Challenges for the EAP Countries," *EURINT*, Centre for European Studies, Universitatea Alexandru Ioan Cuza 3, (2016): 27-44. https://cse.uaic.ro/eurint/proceedings/index_htm_files/EURINT%202016_ROT.pdf.

seat at the table to negotiate a solution. It then impedes the solution while enjoying **the prestige of inclusion at the table**.

Revisionist politics obviously brings an appetite for intervention quite high. So Russian interventionism over the last 10 years can be fitted into these patterns:

1. Specific to the immediate neighbourhood, applied in the 'sphere of influence', as we have seen in the case of Georgia and Ukraine.
2. Triggered by the desire to maintain an identity and status. This may include interventions in the near neighbourhood and intervention in Syria.
3. Driven by strategic interest in controlling ports or access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean or controlling trade routes - cases Georgia, Ukraine (annexation of Crimea), Syria and the Arctic.
4. Supported by economic interests and the establishment as a great power, as can be seen in the cases of the Balkans, Africa and intervention in Syria, Ukraine and the Arctic, with the specification that it involves different approaches in each case.

3. RESEARCH BOUNDARIES

The complexity of this research has brought with it a number of limitations in terms of structuring the whole approach as well as possible. Thus, in the case of international interventions, the case studies were limited to three non-state actors: the UN, NATO and the EU, and two state actors: the US and Russia, in close connection with the idea of the determinism of the international system, the role of the hegemon, revisionist power and international organisations in a highly dynamic security environment.

Conducting research with the aim of building a model for analysing international interventions by following a series of defining indicators of interventions takes the scientific approach to a macro level, to a system analysis, and omits details of the conduct of international interventions, the aim of the paper being to synthesise.

The period studied, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, divides the post-Cold War period and the evolution of international interventions into two, but brings to the fore a considerable development of the instruments and contexts in which international intervention is carried out, generated by the international actors proposed for analysis.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE ANALYSIS MODEL

"Simplicity is solved Complexity."

Constantin Brâncuși

The current research paper follows a qualitative study, using the case study method, applied on several international actors, UN, NATO, EU, USA and Russia. The research comprises 16 case studies, thus practically building a cascade of case studies.

A case study is a research strategy and an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon in its real context and makes it possible to study complex phenomena such as international interventions or interventionism in its abstract name.

According to H. Odum, *"The case study method of data collection is a technique whereby the individual factor, whether an institution or just an episode in the life of an*

*individual or a group, is analysed in its relation to any other element in the group*⁵⁸, thus ensuring that the manifestation of the phenomenon is covered in detail, while at the same time providing a solid foundation for the construction of a highly simplified model of analysis.

In short, we can say that the case study method is a form of qualitative analysis where a careful and complete observation of an individual, a situation or an institution is made; efforts are made to study each aspect of the unit in detail, then generalisations and inferences are drawn from the data.

A case study research may consist of single or multiple case studies, may include quantitative evidence, draws on multiple sources of evidence, and benefits from previously existing theoretical context in order to explore the causes of the underlying principles of the phenomenon under investigation.

The ANALYSIS MATRIX of new forms of interventionism

The analysis matrix is applied to several case studies, in situations where international actors have triggered international interventions, and for each actor several frameworks are presented, with actual interventions, chosen in such a way as to observe the diversity of elements pursued in the research and framed in what we call security interventions, explained by the Copenhagen School paradigm, with an extension of the meaning of the concept of security.

The matrix consists of several parts:

First we analyse the **motivation** of the intervention after which we identify the **legitimacy** of the intervention and how the intervening actor **justifies** it.

REASON OR OBJECTIVE

The reason or object of the intervention is the trigger for the decision to intervene. Motivation often overlaps with justification and legitimacy, but when analysed separately they create the most accurate picture of the type of behaviour of an actor and the type of interventionism.

Motivation in the case of humanitarian intervention is regulated and clear, but if the humanitarian intervention is led by a state or a coalition or under the aegis of an international institution, all these details change the interpretation and show the specific motivation for that situation. By extracting as many details as possible and generalising them, we can end up building a useful and effective analysis model with predictive value.

JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY

Justification is detailed in the research paper as the ways in which the intervening actor shows that it had to intervene, assimilates its behaviour with principles of international law, moral principles or national interests.

Legitimacy is linked to legality, but expressed at the time when the intervention takes place, because legitimacy, the concept of sovereignty and the rules of international law are evolving and dynamic with a major impact on the interpretation of some intervention decisions.

⁵⁸ Howard ODUM,, Katherine JOCHER, , *An Introduction to Social Research*, H. Holt, New York, 1929.

Secondly, the research looks at the **tools and methods** used to intervene, the **concepts that have emerged during intervention, the specific characteristics of intervention** and finally proposes a **type of interventionism**.

The types of interventionism considered are military, humanitarian and soft (those interventions carried out with non-military means). The specific characteristics, the new interpretations of legitimacy and the new instruments used show that each of these types of interventionism takes different forms.

Synthesis matrix no.... - ACTOR Interventionism in CASE STUDY	
Motivation	
Tools and Methods	
Concepts	
Main feature	
Type of interventionism	

Fig. no.1 – Analysis matrix of new forms of interventionism after 11.09.2001 – summary

Finally, we will get a complete picture of the behaviour of an international actor in international interventions, we will trace chronological developments in practice through the emergence of new methods and tools and developments in theory and how the international system comes to legitimise new rules of intervention.

Depending on the characteristics of the international actor and its role in the international system, in the world order at that time, we can observe the differences between their behaviours and explain why a state or an organisation succeeded in imposing a new rule or why the international community accepted or did not accept it and whether there were sanctions or not.

Furthermore, we will look at what types of actors influence the architecture of the international system and to what extent the international system determines behaviour or limits actions, whether its normative role is still important or whether an emerging world order shows us a different type of interaction between its actors.

5. CONCLUSIONS: TYPES OF INTERVENTIONISM - HYBRID SECURITY INTERVENTIONS

Following the application of the constructed analysis matrix, for the final conclusions on the new forms of interventionism, based on the research applied to the 5 international actors and the 16 case studies, we structured the final presentation in the following sections: **analysis of the motivations and objectives of interventionism, analysis of the justification and legitimacy of interventions, analysis of the concepts, methods and tools of interventionism**, and last but not the least **types of interventionism**.

For an inclusive framing of the observed diversities, we conclude that **hybrid security interventions** are currently manifest. By applying the analysis model we simplify and develop abstract models to identify trends and patterns of behaviour.

At the same time, the analysis revealed aspects related to the interventionist profile of each actor, the specific characteristics of the actor and of each intervention, the existence of a certain context and criteria for intervention to be possible, and the influence or determinism that the structure of the international system, of the world order, imposes.

Analysis of the Motivations and Objectives of Interventionism

Looking at the 16 analysis matrices we can see that the **motivations for international interventions** are closely linked to the **type of actor** supporting the interventionist action.

Thus, in the case of international organisations we have general motivations, contained in the constitutive acts that describe their missions, whereas in the case of state actors the motivations are framed by national security strategies and national foreign policy principles. We have also observed that practice has developed their motivations so that they fit into the new reality, the new dynamic security environment, a natural development. What the research is looking at is precisely how actors link the existing normative framework to new forms of interventionism in order to legitimise them within the international community, or, conversely, precisely to challenge the structure of the international system.

In the case of international organisations we have the UN: protecting world peace, ensuring international security from any threat, including phenomena such as terrorism, and protecting civilians, thus including third party intervention in the event of civil war.

When we talk about NATO we exemplify: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the defence of an ally against an attack by a non-state actor; the eradication of the core of international terrorism as a serious threat to international security, but also the defence of civilians from their own government (R2P).

The European Union has humanitarian motivations, centred on its values such as defending human rights, pre-emptive response to protect citizens from their own political regime, overseeing the implementation of peace agreements and the conduct of democratic elections, but also pragmatic, security motivations such as commercial interests, counter-terrorism, border control and protecting trade routes.

For state actors the motivations become more specific and are explained by a complex of factors. In the case of the United States we have: self-defence, eradication of the terrorist threat, humanitarian motivations, protection of human rights, protection of civilians from their

own government, eradication of the threat of the development of a nuclear programme, protection of democratic principles and values, export of democracy, fight against terrorism and the threat of ISIL.

Among the motivations for US intervention, the fight against terrorism, a specific feature of post-9/11 US interventionism, often emerges. It is worth noting the security-humanitarian tandem, so that in cases where we have a strong security interest it appears and doubles as a humanitarian motivation. In the end, war also has this component of winning public opinion on the side of the intervener, and in the case of international interventions it is the moral character that brings the emotion.

If we were to categorise them in order of use, the United States' motivations for intervention are: the fight against terrorism, human rights - protecting civilians, protecting democratic values.

In the case of the Russian Federation, the identified motivations are: strategic, concerning its own military bases in port areas, blocking the expansion of NATO and the EU in regions such as the extended Black Sea area or the Western Balkans, securing energy routes, protecting its status in the region, increasing its influence in regions such as the Middle East and Africa, defending or promoting economic and commercial interests in these areas, political control in the Western Balkans area, control of trade routes and economic interests linked to subsoil wealth, all contributing to the intention to manifest itself as a global player.

The specifics of the Russian Federation's motivations to intervene relate to the region where it intervenes, geopolitical assertiveness and economic interests. The differences are underlined by the region in which it operates, as well as the main directions of Russian foreign policy over time.

Motivations and objectives, which largely overlap, are declared either before the intervention begins or during it, as we may face protracted interventions and motivations change depending on the stage, or simply the timing of the unveiling of the motivation is part of the war strategy.

On the other hand, we can also see a differentiation between motivations and objectives, in the sense that we consider motivation as the trigger for the intention to intervene presented to the international community, and objectives as the national interests pursued through international intervention. This can be the case for state actors, either as the main actors of the interventionist action/military operation or as part of an organisation or coalition of the willing.

Behind the motivation will always be the national interest in the case of state actors, and in the case of international organisations we have generically the mission for which they were established and a combination of negotiated national interests.

The research also shows the impact of different and/or divergent national objectives, where intervention is supported by multiple actors, on the evolution and profile of international intervention - see the case of Afghanistan, from both ISAF and OEF perspectives.

Another aspect worth highlighting is that motivations show us the potential triggers for international interventions and by analysing them we can anticipate them, but moreover, we can build peacekeeping solutions and minimise conflict situations.

Analysis of the Justification and Legitimacy of Interventions

Justification and legitimacy imply both the legality of the intervention and its necessity. In practice, international intervention is justified by its necessity, whether it stems from the defence of fundamental values or from the defence of national interests.

Legitimacy involves complicated debates, includes interpretations of the rules of international law, brings new concepts awaiting validation in practice, and includes precedents which, through global acceptance, become customary. The more the international community gets involved or accepts one of these cases, the richer the field of international interventions becomes with **new forms of legitimacy**.

In the case of international organisations interventions are challenged. It is for example the intervention of NATO in the Kosovo case area which created a precedent and a reproach subsequently used by the Russian Federation to justify its interventions,

The validity of interventions authorised by the UN lies precisely in the legitimacy and universality of the international organisation. The decision-making system within the Security Council means that the state actors with the greatest influence in the international system reach a compromise in the case of international interventions, although here too there is a debate about expanding the composition of the Security Council so that it better represents the international community. The justification for intervention under the UN lies in defending human rights, protecting civilians, defending world peace and ensuring international security, all of which are basic principles of the organisation and of each member.

NATO after the terrorist attacks in 2001 was faced with reinventing and strengthening its global role. The activation of Article 5 legitimises the actions in Afghanistan and the mission subsequently carried out through UN resolutions. In the case of Libya, legitimacy is conferred by the UN authorisation and mandate of Operation Unified Protector. The justification for involvement in such interventions lies in the organisation's objectives, its role and its interest in remaining a relevant guarantor of security for its members.

The European Union conducts international interventions within a highly regulated framework with dedicated policies, so legitimacy is not always under scrutiny.

Their justification stems from the European Union's ambitions to assert itself as a global player, but it also aims to cover certain types of missions that complement NATO or UN efforts in certain regions. At the same time, the interventions are also aimed at mitigating threats to European security, particularly from neighbouring regions. The fact is that the EU is not leading a combat mission and is therefore not subject to the debate on the legitimacy of the use of force.

Complexity arises in the case of state actors, whose mobility in setting their national security strategies is greater, so that they can more easily adjust the formal framework needed in justifying the pursuit of national interests through international interventions.

In the case of the United States we have on the one hand the role of world leader and on the other the national interest.

The case of Iraq shows us a lot about how to report on legitimacy. Although efforts were made to obtain Security Council authorisation, in the end the US committed itself to intervene in Iraq, bearing the bulk of the costs, attracting to its side a coalition of the willing that was predominantly a supporter rather than a consistent contributor to military action.

By being at the helm of the global system, the US was able to advance intervention, stepping **outside the boundaries of compliance imposed by legitimacy, demonstrating that it is not a structural constraint**. There were criticisms, but in the end the intervention was accepted because the US was able to impose an argument: coalition of the willing, legitimacy emanating internally through the approval of the US Congress, liberating Iraq from a dictator and protecting the population and applying the principles of unilateral preventive war. They applied a **legitimising strategy** with new elements, different from those already validated by the international community.

The justification is economic interests and access to energy resources in the region, and in the second intervention in Iraq, continued control of access to resources and the fight against terrorism and the ISIL terrorist group.

The US also brings another new model, of **indirect intervention** through logistical support in Syria and Yemen, the **justification and legitimacy being humanitarian and in defence of international security**, in the first case the majority of international actors agree to the intervention.

The interventions in Iraq 2014 and Libya 2011 add novelty to the evolving spectrum of legitimacy and we have international intervention **following an invitation from the government of those states**.

The intervention in Haiti is an interesting model because the US justifies its intervention **by defending democratic values and legitimises the action as humanitarian**. It argues that **only a democratic regime can ensure the existence of a government favourable to the Haitian people**.

The intervention in Afghanistan remains as a landmark for this research, being one of the interventions with a high level of complexity and the one that opens the period studied, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Here, legitimacy clearly stemmed from the right to self-defence recognised by the UN Charter and, subsequently, developments are justified by the fight against terrorism, a fight against a phenomenon, which means that the way such interventions will proceed is largely governed by practice. The United Nations has also played an important role, and through a resolution it has succeeded in imposing a new approach to the behaviour of the international community in the face of this new phenomenon.

The Russian Federation justifies this by its **ambition to assert itself as a global power** and intervenes militarily in the region, but also to **maintain control over the former Soviet republics, and by other means - economic, ideological - in other more remote areas**.

As legitimacy it uses precedents, it uses the narrative of ethnic Russians demanding annexation with Russia - proven by holding referendums, it uses an ideological system, it uses the fact that intervention in the near neighbourhood is a natural act, especially as it is seen as an action to defend its borders and security in the face of the advance of NATO and the EU into the sphere of privileged interests. Strategic, territorial interests, control or control of points providing access to trade routes also play an important role.

Analysis of interventionist concepts, methods and tools

The concepts, methods and tools used are those nuances that show the evolution of forms of interventionism in detail. They emerge and develop gradually and are strongly

determined by power relations, the capacity and position of actors within the international system and the geopolitical context.

In the case of international organisations, similarly to the situation of motivations, the instruments used fall within the limits of the constitutive or operational documents, whereas in the case of state actors the malleability with which they introduce new types of instruments is greater, increasing their ability to pursue their interests more effectively.

In this respect, while in the case of international organisations we have the classic missions of stabilisation, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, in the case of state actors we have the fight against terrorism, the fight against insurgency, intervention under coalition of the willing, direct military intervention, indirect military intervention, regime change, preventive war, defence of democracy, invitation to intervene on behalf of a government, referendum, information warfare, frozen conflict, annexation of region, self-proclamation of independence.

The multiplicity of instruments confirms the complexity of the interventionist phenomenon and the evolution of its forms in a relatively short period of history.

The concepts are those that come to confirm and reinforce the methods and tools used, such as in the case of Russia, which uses as tools referendum, separatist regions and self-proclamation of independence or even more annexation of a region of another sovereign state, comes and develops justifying by protecting Russian speakers from an auspicious government and deepening with the ideological system created : Russian World, New Russia and divided nation.

Types of interventionism - hybrid security interventions

The interventionist profile is also determined by the place and role occupied by the actor under study in the international system. We have the cases of a leader, the hegemon of the system, a power with a revisionist policy, but with regional power capacity and international organisations with different missions and history. The place and role of the actor adds specificities and limits of movement alongside the general framework of rules of the system, including defining the limits of the actor's ability to introduce new rules into the system regarding the possibility, justification and legitimacy of international intervention.

The analysis reveals a great diversity of situations, even in the case of a single actor, and the fact that the period studied is long, which contributed to the identification of a large number of cases. The usefulness of the work is given by the grouping of these cases following the essentialisation of the characteristics and types of interventionism.

At the same time we see a combination of old indicators in the category of motivations with new indicators that complement what already exists - for example human rights evolving to protection of civilians and human security.

In the case of the justification and legitimacy of international interventions, we see the introduction of new rules, which are still contested by some actors and therefore not fully accepted by the international community as a whole, but which represent developments in the rules of international law. The power of precedent in international affairs and the trajectory of a precedent in consolidating itself as a norm must also be stressed. Certainly, the introduction of new norms, such as the responsibility to protect, or the use of precedent, are closely linked to the role and place of the actor promoting or making that intervention. Research shows that

it is the leader, and therefore the manager of the international system, who has the ability to trigger these two situations in an easy way.

Another aspect that emerged from this research is the region in which the interventionist actor operates. This aspect becomes relevant for two reasons - the first would be the low cost of a geographically close intervention, which does not require troop deployments and war logistics, and the second relates to the area of influence, which through control ensures its status in the international arena and access to resources.

There is a great deal of variety in the category of tools - concepts, methods - as security threats multiply and become more and more challenging, the responses, defensive solutions and modes of action become more numerous and innovative. The flight for security is spreading to all areas of society and interaction between states, so that the general regulation of the international system is often out of touch with reality.

Following the application of the analysis matrices we have the following types of interventionism:

Military interventionism (in response to an aggressor's attack, self-defence, indirect intervention, hybrid) - in 9 out of 16 cases

Humanitarian interventionism (R2P type) - in 3 out of 16 cases

Soft interventionism (normative, economic) - in 4 out of 16 cases

Humanitarian interventionism is specific to the human rights motivation, extended in the post-Cold War period to the protection of civilians including from one's own government (responsibility to protect) and usually occurs in operations led by international organisations. It has been noted where the security motivation is not so prominent. In contrast, military interventionism, which explains the majority of the interventions analysed, is that which is primarily motivated by defence against eminent threats, ensuring international security or defending regional strategic interests or in areas of vital interest. This usually occurs in the case of state actors with the capacity to trigger international interventions, as we observe in the paper in the cases of the US and Russia.

However, military interventionism differs from case to case, and there are also differences in the analysis of the same actor. The specific characteristics show an evolution and diversity in the approach to an intervention, depending on the region where intervention takes place, the economic and strategic interests at the time, the instruments used and especially the way in which the legitimacy of the intervention is justified. The mechanism for legitimising intervention is the most debated issue worldwide in the event of war.

Soft interventionism covers interventions carried out with non-military instruments and without the mission of combat operations. It can be found in the European Union, which has become a benchmark for this model of interventionism, as it is considered to be the greatest normative power, but also in state actors seeking to influence the policy of certain states in order to gain economic and political benefits.

Security interventions

The analysis of international (military) interventions through the prism of the Copenhagen School security paradigm helps to open new avenues for critical studies and evaluations of contemporary interventions beyond the existing ones.

In the case of contemporary international interventions, by omitting the notion of 'security', intervention impact assessments will fail to take into account the criteria guiding that

intervention. For example, the assessment of an international intervention in the context of post-conflict reconstruction is flawed if it omits the fact that the purpose of an intervention today is to guarantee the (national) security of those intervening. Therefore, understanding the meaning of the term security means understanding an integrative empirical aspect of these interventions, how they are framed and using a common language in analysing them.

At the same time, confirming international interventions as security interventions means taking seriously their deeply political character, which goes hand in hand with the notion of security.

The invocation of 'security' also claims a condition of urgency and implicitly "*the right to use any means necessary to block an emerging threat*"⁵⁹. Thus the notion of "security" and its invocation becomes a powerful justificatory tool.

Reconceptualising international military interventions as 'security interventions' allows analysts and researchers to consider the complex reality of these interventions and the recent relevance of the term security.

Hybrid models of intervention

We started from the exposition of military interventions as traditional forms of intervention, added humanitarian interventions as a globally accepted and used form, then, through the exposition of case studies, in a chronological manner, outlined a series of changes and evolutions, starting from motivations, justifications, ways of achieving but also explaining legitimacy, to concepts, methods and tools of intervention. All these developments in the interventionist phenomenon give it the characteristic of a hybrid, with the specification that here the term hybrid underlines the complexity of the instruments used, especially non-military ones.

The acceptance of the notion of hybrid in this research is also underlined by the existence of these new ways of triggering and carrying out international interventions.

From military-humanitarian I propose security interventions as a comprehensive and complex framing of contemporary international interventions.

The phrase **hybrid security interventions** thus encompasses both the theoretical framing and the way interventions happen in the current international system.

Innovation springs from the interweaving of disciplines, ideas, typologies, models, systems and the list goes on. And innovation brings progress, it brings newness to the world we live in. Hybrid security interventions can be a model and a name that explains the evolving complexity of actors' behaviour in an ever-changing international system.

Finally, by building new mechanisms of legitimation and justification, by validating motivations, by identifying new instruments, the aim is to increase the acceptability of international interventions within the international community. Of course, there will always be critics, and very well argued ones, but every time the winners write history and those in power make the rules of the present and the future.

⁵⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1997), 21.