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#### Doctoral thesis:

# ANALYSIS OF THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMMIGRANT CRISIS 2015-2016

Decision-making processes and institutional balance

**Summary** 

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## ANALYSIS OF THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMMIGRANT CRISIS 2015-2016

#### **Decision-making processes and institutional balance**

Of

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Irregular migration is one of the most important and complex issues that the European Union has had to manage and which has generated structural changes in the evolution of migration policy, on the vision on integration, the inter-institutional relations established with the countries of origin of immigrants and the opportunity to debate on how a balance can be struck between protecting the identities of newcomers on the one hand and guaranteeing the preservation of their own identity and the liberal values of European states on the other.

This reason was the basis for choosing and arguing this research thesis by referring to two theories formulated in the late 1980s but which may find widespread applicability in current migration crises: societal security promoted by the Copenhagen School and risk society argued by sociologist Ulrich Beck.

We appreciate that through this comprehensive analysis of the balance between consolidating the democratic values of European liberalism and the limits of multiculturalism / tolerance in a living clash of identities, novelty elements in the field of political science are reached contributing in finding the most suitable methods of integrating those who reach the territory of the European Union in a legal way. An uncontrolled migration, of considerable magnitude and carried out in a compressed time horizon as shown by the peak of the crisis of 2015-2016, presents the prospects of significant threats to the identity of the host population and the state social order and these consequences must become a general concern for the academical path, political leaders, public authorities and other relevant actors in order to identify valid solutions over time both in terms of integration and the limitation of irregular migration.

#### I. Introduction

The anthropological evidence and recent scientific studies have shown that migration has always played an important role in the genetic structure of the human being and the transformation of the desire to explore and know new lands into an effective human movement has manifested itself through the natural activation of dynamic goals, dictated by the specifics of each epoch in the evolution of *homo sapiens*. In fact, some authors consider that, in addition to the fertility and mortality component, the spatial mobility of people is the third decisive element of population's evolution<sup>1</sup>.

The means by which migration developed were in a continuous interdependence with the magnitude reached by the phenomenon at a given time, therefore generating different migratory flows. In this sense, Myron Weiner stated that "the only law that regulates migration is that its flow, once started, it controls its own debit".

The issue of European migration in the last century has been marked by the complex effects of globalization, initially viewed only from an economic perspective and the satellite domains that it has indirectly influenced. Thus, the reduction in transport costs has led to an unprecedented increase in trade; the rapidity of data transfer and increased access to information resources have moved the level of communication between states and between citizens within states to an unimaginable frequency; the facilitation of intergovernmental relations, the emergence of international non-governmental organizations and changes in the structure of traditional elements of nation-states have led to a hybridization of the manifestation of sovereignty and therefore a resettlement of political, social and religious values within European states.

From the social composition's perspective, the 21st century is marked not only by the triple irregular equation of births-deaths-migration, but also by access to technology, the women's role in society, the distribution of resources in different economies, growth dissensions between microsocieties within the same state, religious bigotry in some states and the conservative barrier with populist influences found in other states.

Muslims make up the majority of immigrants in most European countries but unlike the United States where migration was the basis of the state itself, in Europe mass migration was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Remus Gabriel Anghel, István Horváth, *Sociology of migration: Romanian theories and case studies*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2009, p. 129.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Robert S. Leiken, *European Islamists*, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, p. 177.

triggered much later, with the development of modern means of transport and communication. In addition to this, migration to Europe has hit the wall of the ethnicity of the nation-state and well-cohesive communities through language, culture, religion and common memory.

The first significant waves of Muslim immigrants arrived in Europe after its population was decimated as a result of World War II and implicitly the labor force was severely affected. Out of a desire to make up for the shortage of labor and to avoid the relocation of American-style factories and a forced economic crisis of inflation, Western European states quickly turned to recruiting a workforce willing to accept jobs that would remained vacant and were poorly paid compared to the "claims" of the local population. Therefore, the precarious economic situation was the main factor that initially determined Muslim migrants to come to Europe and the temporary employment contracts imposed by some Western European states also matched the desire of immigrants to save money and return home for a better living<sup>3</sup>. Subsequently, staying there proved to be permanent and the adaptation of the authorities and the population of the host states was one with multiple errors of analysis.

The migratory flow from Western Europe is characterized in the '60s and' 70s by the lack of clear regulatory policies being more a *policy of clientelism*, as classified by James Q. Wilson. Specifically, employers were the direct beneficiaries in terms of the low wages they paid to Muslim immigrants and their high labor availability and the costs of additional infrastructure consumed by immigrants were borne by society as a whole. This period is significant for the present as it represents the moment of the first generation who were born of immigrant parents but who had acquired the citizenship of the host state and implicitly benefited from all the associated rights.

The lack of public debates on migration and integration was based on a "false relaxation" of political leaders who believed that simply opening borders for "exotic" populations without clear mechanisms for monitoring and integrating them would help ensure a balanced labor market without consider the impact on societal security<sup>4</sup>. Political parties were limited to maintaining and convincing their electorate through economic stability, which in turn was made possible by continuous innovation and a corresponding workforce. The social and political consequences that these new populations generated at the social level were hardly analyzed at all. No European government anticipated how the ethnic mix that would occur could make the host society

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Robert S. Leiken, *op.cit*. pp. 175-176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Robert S. Leiken, op. cit., p. 181-182.

vulnerable by generating identity conflicts with repercussions in the sphere of social and even physical security.

#### II. The novelty of the research and the methodology used

This research thesis, entitled "Analysis of the vulnerabilities of the European Union in the context of the migrant crisis 2015-2016. Decision-making processes and institutional balance", aims to demonstrate the trajectory and the way in which uncontrolled migration can generate vulnerabilities for the social security of the European Union by relating to the disruption of the multidimensional socio-cultural nucleus around which gravitate the individuals of a society that shares a unique language, civic values and common cultural elements but also an institutional loyalty based on a historical heritage of nation building. The secondary objective of this research topic is to identify the main integration stimuli but also the most important obstacles that block the integration process and remove the cultural minority from the sense of social, political or even cultural belonging of the host society.

Although the basic theory of social security emerged and was debated in the early 1990s by Copenhagen School theorists, the threats and vulnerabilities described in the issue of uncontrolled migration became practical only a decade later when the first signs of challenges produced their migration arose. Subsequently, the migration micro-crisis of 2011 was the preamble to what would be the culmination of a general migration crisis with effects throughout the European Union, namely the crisis of 2015-2016.

The motivation for choosing the research of this topic consists in the variety and complexity derived from the consequences generated by the phenomenon of uncontrolled migration both from a political-economic perspective, but especially societal in a context where the immediate need to identify quick but valid solutions over time must become a general concern for academia, political leaders, public authorities and other relevant actors.

The specialized literature but also the public debate were related especially to the issue of migration from an economic perspective, being trivialized depending on the historical moment that was crossed and in political and social analyzes with timid references to the component of social security. Thus, given the importance and magnitude of the impact of the challenges posed by uncontrolled migration in an unprecedented dynamic for the European Union, we appreciate that through this comprehensive analysis of the balance between strengthening the democratic

values of European liberalism and the limits of multiculturalism / tolerance in a living clash of identities reach sufficient elements of *novelty* in the field of political science, contributing practically to finding the most appropriate methods of integrating of those who reach the territory of the European Union in a legal way.

The research methodology uses the framing, crossing and applicability of the neofunctional and constructivist theory in the issue of migration and integration at the level of the European Union. I have also used and capitalized on the filter of the basic theory of social security promoted by the Copenhagen School but also the theory of risk society argued by the famous sociologist Ulrich Bech. The application of these theories was based on the purpose of identifying the anchor sources on which the new societal vulnerabilities generated by uncontrolled migration are built, but also the practical solutions that can be accessed from the theories stated for managing these new types of vulnerabilities and threats. In the same time, I have tried to answer the most difficult dilemma around migration, namely: what are the multicultural boundaries in a globalized society but with strong national roots and how is the balance between conservating and preserving identities within the same multicultural state established?

Within the research process, the practical component found in *the case study conducted in Romania* and the *parallelism of the two integration models applied by the French Republic and Germany* aimed at proving societal vulnerabilities generated by uncontrolled migration while exploring the main challenges of the integration process and which in turn can outline effects in the sphere of identity's security in the host society.

The general objective of the case study was to analyze and interpret the most common difficulties found in socio-cultural and economic relations in the integration process for a sample of 30 refugees from the Middle East and Africa in the period 2015-2020 taking into account the intentions, behaviors, will, motivations but also the specific ethno-cultural differences in relation to the Romanian society as well as six questionnaires applied online to the relevant NGOs and the General Inspectorate for Immigration, having as key objective the identification and analysis of the main difficulties in the integration process but also the socio-cultural and economic pretensions expressed by those who arrived voluntarily or accidentally in Romania. The interpretation of the data is made by filtering the theory of social security and rational choice (cost-benefit) which models both the political decision and institutional action and social relations within the host society.

The specific purpose of the research interviews was to establish the degree of causality and functionality between the capacity of integration / assimilation by the Romanian state as a member of the multicultural European Union and the flexibility / ethno-cultural rigidity of migrants maintained by socio-cultural mechanisms and complex civilizations. This approach has been interpreted in terms of societal vulnerabilities and the limits of tolerance for integration.

Also, a secondary objective of the study was to transpose the argumentation of the interpretation of the data obtained in the broader framework of the comparative studies on integration at a European level.

Both the semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the target group and the online questionnaires applied to the relevant NGOs and the Inspectorate General for Immigration contained open and closed questions pre-arranged and divided into 9 sections that follow all specific theoretical elements and indications - questions introductory; passing questions or buffer; filter questions; bifurcated questions; control questions and identification questions:

- 1. Motivation for emigration and knowledge of economic, social and professional characteristics;
  - 2. Access to the public health system;
  - 3. Access to the public education system;
  - 4. Access to the labor market as a determining factor of integration;
  - 5. Access to temporary or permanent housing;
- 6. Participation in public life, relations with Romanian institutions and the importance of citizenship;
  - 7. The cultural perspective as a facilitator of integration;
  - 8. Degree of acceptance and tolerance in the host society;
  - 9. Demographic knowledge data.

The case study is divided into two components:

1. A number of 30 people from the target group who answered the semi-structured face-to-face interviews, each interview being composed of a number of 70 closed and open questions according to the annex.

2. A number of 4 relevant NGOs and two public institutions - the General Inspectorate for Immigration as the main institution in the management and implementation of migration policy and migration integration and the Galati County Employment Agency - an online questionnaire consisting of 45 closed and open-ended questions according to the Annex was addressed to each of them.

The methodology used in the semi-structured face-to-face interviews is that of qualitative research according to the model of Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, which involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach to the subject studied by using and collecting a variety of empirical materials, in order to describe ordinary and special moments in the life of individuals as well as their meanings for them<sup>5</sup>.

The naturalistic approach of *qualitative research* assumes that the researcher does not manipulate the variables, but seeks to understand the phenomena that occur naturally, not in experimental situations<sup>6</sup>. Pierre Paille shows that qualitative research approaches the object of study in an open way and ultimately leads to a story or a theory, not a demonstration<sup>7</sup>. Thus, for a qualitative sociological research it is necessary to report on values by the comprehensive method and in the case of the present case study, the analysis of the interviews was based on the European values and principles of democracy, fundamental human rights and freedoms or equal opportunities.

In order to establish the hypotheses, I took into account both European and national legislation on migration and asylum, as well as the confirmation of intentional and behavioral issues registered so far in other European countries whose integration experiences have been used in composing and distributing questions.

In operationalizing the concepts used in the semi-structured interviews and online questionnaires, I considered the time frame of the migration process of all elements in which immigrants are involved, namely: *integration-tolerance / multiculturalism-ethno-cultural and linguistic barriers*; *vulnerable society-systemic risks*.

We applied in the interpretation of semi-structured face-to-face interviews and online questionnaires the case-oriented strategy developed by Huberman and Miles (1998) involving case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Septimiu Chelcea, *Sociological research methodology: quantitative and qualitative methods*, Echonomical Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 59-60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 62.

analysis and the development of an analytical model that is subsequently verified by analyzing other cases and identifying common elements. We also used in the interpretation of the data the *strategy of the interactive synthesis* by constructing a summary of each section of the 9 of the structure of the research interviews and subsequently condensing them into a single exposition with comparative elements.

For the coding of the study, *the open line coding procedure applied* to each section of the 9 of the interview was used by compressing and assembling the data obtained in the set of concepts mentioned above. The purpose of line-by-line open coding is to build categories and test theories of social security and the vulnerabilities of the risk society in the multicultural context.

The interpretation of the 9 sections of the structure of the semi-structured face-to-face interview and of the online questionnaires applied to the profile NGOs and I.G.I focuses on the following questions of interest:

- 1. How consistent is the integration policy of the Romanian state for the persons of the target group from the perspective of the beneficiaries and the facilitating institutions?
- 2. How is Romania viewed and what are the expectations of the target group in relation to their stay in Romania?
  - 3. What are the medium and long term projections related to the stay in Romania?
  - 4. To what extent is there an efficient circuit of integration into the labor market?
- 5. What is their role and how involved are public institutions and private companies in the integration of people from the target group on the Romanian labor market?
- 6. How is the process of educating children of foreigners evaluated and what difficulties are there among adults regarding the recognition of acquired qualifications / skills?
  - 7. What is the degree of access to the public health system?
- 8. How do respondents relate to the integration facilities they have experienced and what is the opinion of the integration facilitators?
- 9. How effective or harmful is the attitude of the local population in the process of adaptation / integration of immigrants?
- 10. What is the role of profile associations and NGOs in the integration process in relation to the influence of public authorities and what is the perception of the respondents regarding the help they receive from them?
  - 11. What is the predisposition of cultural assimilation on the part of newcomers?

- 12. How far is the boundary of tolerance in cultural and religious preferences?
- 13. How ready is the Romanian state to integrate migrants?
- 14. What are the main obstacles that immigrants have encountered in terms of integration?

#### III. Limitations

The limitations of the case study result mainly from five directions: the difficulty of identifying and establishing the communication relationship with the refugees from the target group; their fear and reduced willingness to answer certain questions; lack of experience in Romania and interaction with the local population; Romania's geographical position on the migration route, respectively transit state; the preponderance of qualitative research. Conducting face-to-face interviews by establishing a common language was another factor that contributed to the restrictive interpretation of the research. We should also consider the history and causes of the arrival of refugees in Romania, which consequently influenced the answers and the results of the research.

#### IV. Conclusions

Throughout its history, the European Union has faced multiple crises and challenges that have tested its resilience, its core values, its credibility and external influence, as well as its institutional willingness to adapt. Irregular migration is one of the most important and complex issues the European Union faced and which has generated structural changes in the evolution of migration policy, the vision on integration, the inter-institutional relations established with the countries of origin of immigrants and the opportunity to debate on how to balance between protecting the identities of newcomers on the one hand, and guaranteeing the preservation of local identity and liberal values of the member states, on the other hand.

The novelty brought by this new wave of immigration that started in 2011 and continued until now, with its peak in the crisis of 2015-2016, is given by the intentions, causes, motivations, amplitude, and access to tools to facilitate illegal migration to Europe. In a digitalized era where the information crosses physical, metaphysical, cultural or religious boundaries at a much higher speed than necessary to understand and adapt, the decision-making mechanisms of national and supranational authorities, this migration crisis and its cultural, economic, legal consequences, political and social issues implication for the member states of the European Union, mark the need

for a comprehensive analysis, designed to address the most sensitive and dynamic dilemmas around migration discussion.

Often, Syrian refugee reports, for example, show that the decision to leave the country of origin was based on information found on the internet, or from relatives, friends or other acquaintances who were already in the target countries: Sweden, Germany, or the United Kingdom. Therefore, we observe how access to information and the technological development decisively boost migratory flows to an unprecedented extent and with an impressive capacity to influence the migration trend. Moreover, the development and easy access to transport routes, increases and diversifies the way in which illegal migration takes place, making it very difficult for EU member states to combat the phenomenon.

Another unique element identified in this migration crisis is the aspect of the intentional duplicity of immigrants or the difficulty of determining the likelihood of the cause of migration for many who arrive in the European Union. Thus, the authorities find themselves in the situation of differentiating immigrants for purely economic reasons from refugees coming from a permanent internal and external crisis, adding the pressure of populist parties that use this "emotional weapon" for electoral purposes. I have shown from the beginning of this paper that the number of those who respect the definition of refugee and those who try to take advantage of them by mixing with them, even though their lives are not directly and immediately threatened, but simply seek to obtain better living conditions than in the country of origin, it is relatively the same according to studies carried out during the peak of the crisis.

Naturally, every individual has the right to a better living, but European policy makers have to solve a complex issue: a balanced policy that analyzes the option of limiting economic migration and refugees or an open border approach, assuming the social, political, economic and long-term impact on the culture? Therefore, in addition to criticism on the medium and long-term economic aspects, positive for some European states, political leaders have also exploited intensely isolated aggression and terrorist actions against the locals.

Since migration cannot be completely stopped and it is not a realistic and efficient option, the solution to this complicated issue must fall between the two main dimensions of the analysis: limiting and controlling irregular migration versus the integration of those who already entered legally on the territory of the European Union. Of course, there are multiple aspects vectors that can change the balance in one direction or another. For example, who determines the legal

migration limit or proportion, depending on what indicators and to what extent can the migration be limited?

What are the most appropriate methods for integration, how can we evaluate the quality of integration and what happens in case of failure? Certainly, the issue of migration affects multiple branches of the society which are interdependent by the nature of their functionality, which is why the conclusions of this research paper combine the political, economic and social components around migration focusing on the impact on social security.

As presented in the *First Chapter*, European Union's member states have struggled and slowed down the negotiating and the process of aligning common standards on migration policy. Changes in the migration procedures and mechanisms didn't keep up with development of factors that stimulated migration (transport, technology, etc.), and on top of it, the fragmentation given by the mandatory unilateral commitment by the member states in decision making. The Treaty of Lisbon is a real step forward in unblocking decision-making in an area that fell overwhelmingly within national competence by introducing the solidarity clause, a legal innovation that allows the European institutions to take over a significant part of the migration policy architecture.

The European Union designed and implemented the framework process for managing migration in two main categories: first, political decisions and agreements on legal migration, such as facilitating migration as a labor force and settlements with countries of origin to agree on temporary migration channels or readmission measures and second, actions to combat illegal migration and to share responsibility between member states for taking over on asylum seekers' applications. In a legal context of division of competences between national authorities and the European Community, the admission, rejection or integration of newcomers generated a complex analysis of direct costs for the host state and has led to disagreements between member state governments and the general migration policy drafted in Brussels.

This lobby for imposing the political will was seen during the entire migration crisis that began in 2011, and especially in the peak reached in 2015-2016. Whether it is the suspension of the Schengen Agreement, building of wire fences or the rejection of refugee quotas decided in Brussels or the debauchery of the terms of the Dublin Regulation, the image of the European Union has shown inconsistency and lack of solidarity in many of these moments. Moreover, if we look more in-depth at the most sensitive treaties and legal agreements between member states on

migration, we see that almost every measure of liberalization of human movement and implicitly of displacement or sharing of national competences in the field of migration, came with compensatory measures that can be activated at any time by any of the signatory states, a clear proof of strong conservatism and mistrust between member states, taking into consideration the way the European Union was built and the history of relations between states.

Although European Union's initial response to the migration crisis was chaotic and incoherent, European political and administrative bodies subsequently sought to stabilize and standardize the response to the crisis while opening the debate on the urgent need for migration reforms. Tripling financial resources, supplementing manpower and streamlining Triton or Poseidon operations under FRONTEX, civilian missions such as EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUNAVFOR Med, the "Mare Nostrum" military mission which was later replaced by Operation Sophia, and inter-institutional consolidation between Europol, Easo and Eurojust have managed to provide a "respite" for policy makers by consistently reducing the extent of irregular migration. In addition, the new European Border Police and Coast Guard Agency, which replaced FRONTEX, has made important changes in the legal field by obtaining the power to intervene in the event of an external migration at European borders. This translates into a sharing of state sovereignty with European bodies.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed by the European Commission in autumn 2020 is an ambitious one and envisages far-reaching changes in the structure and functioning of migration and asylum policy. The aim is to increase the influence of European bodies to the detriment of national competences and is mainly aimed at a much more rigorous control of irregular migration. However, we must emphasize that the European Commission's proposal still has many political steps to negotiate until a coherent, sustainable, and responsible migration policy is outlined, considering the divers dissensions within the European Union. The leaders will and the different political priorities of the member states, as well as their concerns and different levels of socio-economic development, make it difficult for implementing a common migration and asylum policy.

The *Second Chapter* can be considered the theoretical landmark of this paper as it brings together the most relevant theories and references that can be applied in the issue of migration from the perspective of societal vulnerability. Most studies on the impact of irregular migration

have rather focused on economic and social analysis, ignoring the cultural challenges it generates and which can be translated into more significant economic and security costs.

The theorists of the Copenhagen School have shown that new types of threats must be framed in up-to-date approaches, in line with the role and evolution of the nation-state but also with new multicultural realities, unusual for many European nations that were relatively homogeneous. Although in the 80's these theories were trivialized due to the favorable economic situation, the lack of social and cultural demands of the first generation of immigrants who were satisfied with a precarious socio-economic status but also a constant political context, focused on a discourse oriented towards economic well-being and less on the identity component, they are beginning to prove their applicability with the increased phenomenon of migration but also of other politico-cultural dynamics within the European states.

Barry Buzan considers that we can talk about ensuring an unaltered social security as long as the traditional elements of language, cultural and religious customs are ensured within the limits of an acceptable evolution in a society. Or in the case of an ethno-cultural mixture produced on a large scale and in a short time, the preservation of society's identity elements that is facing such a migration can suffer malformations. Specifically, migration is the most important threat to social security in terms of altering the identity of the host society and escalating cultural and religious conflict.

Therefore, identity is at the heart of the concept of social security and even if some authors consider that the role of identity in today's multicultural society is not as significant as it was for the last century, a careful analysis of recent events reveals the interest of preserving the inherited identities that have also adapted to the nuances dictated by the new social landmarks, lifestyles, occupations, reports on the globalization of communications and transport, etc. After all, we admit that any society is based on a legacy of practices, values, spoken and written language, religion or civic and social customs that create the natural socio-political, economic and cultural attachment of individuals within that society and which forms the national identity. The reflex of protecting the specific cultural identity is a natural one for each nation even in a multicultural environment by referring to a register of common values or to a constitutional patriotism.

Uncontrolled migration of considerable magnitude, as shown by the height of the 2015-2016 crisis, presents the prospects of significant threats to the identity of the host population and the state social order. Evidence of this is provided by the case of social unrest, mass rapes in

Germany and other individual terrorist attacks following the arrival of over one million refugees and economic immigrants in 2015. Even if these acts of aggression fall within the area of physical security of individuals and the state itself, the causes that generated and fueled these outbreaks by some of the newcomers have cultural, educational, religious and civic foundations.

Studies have shown that there is a direct causal relationship between cultural differences within a society, namely the attempt of one group to dominate the identity of other groups and the increased risk of identity conflict. Obviously the majority group in a state has all the political, economic and institutional leverage to impose its cultural identity on minority groups but when this happens in an aggressive manner there is rejection from the minority who needs to protect her own identity.

Therefore, in order to avoid this scenario, the representatives of the majority group have the responsibility to create, in a first stage, mechanisms of equitable socio-economic and political integration for the minority groups so that the most sensitive feelings of belonging such as religious or cultural to not be affected.

Even if for the states of the European Union religion is only an optional and completely separate confessional landmark from the socio-political organization of the state, for Muslims, religion is at the heart of all activities, behaviors and forms of social, political, economic and even military organization. This reality was the basis of many violent clashes with an identity-religious substratum, one of the most eloquent examples being the attack on "Charlie Hebdo" which showed exactly this diametrically opposed way of relating to religion: on the one hand the secular French whose culture, education, values, or religious evolution favors criticism of anyone and everything in any circumstance (in our case, the caricature of the Prophet Muhammad) and on the other hand, the first or even second generation French Muslims, supported by the "ummah" community who saw in the caricature of the Prophet Muhammad an insult and a threat to the religious identity that "deserves" to be avenged. The terrorist attack was one of the clearest evidences of a completely unintegrated community, which does not find itself or is not interested in adopting the democratic values of the host state marking an identity conflict with consequences in social security. Moreover, the intensification of religious attacks in several European cities caused by immigrants and refugees arriving in the context of the crisis of 2015-2016 have brought back into public's debate the limits of identities that a state can withstand and the time needed to adapt and integrate the new ones.

The second important theory used in the elaboration of this research deals with *the risk society* and the way in which migration has contributed to the diversification of internal vulnerabilities but also to the risks's import. The second important theory used in the elaboration of this research deals with the risk society and the way in which migration has contributed to the diversification of internal vulnerabilities but also to the import of risks. The wave of accelerated modernization and the achievement of high levels of development in the Western world coincided with a ebb of physical's, political's, economic's and even identity's insecurities. As we have seen at the economic level, the European Union seems to be the victim of its own social security system, becoming the most important pole of attraction for migration, which brings with it pressure translated into material, diplomatic and "soft power" costs.

At the same time, declining birth rates and the need to maintain a competitive labor market are forcing Member States to attract labor from outside the European Union, although the unemployment rate is high precisely because of the social compensation system that rivals the need to accept a poorly paid job. In this context, immigration seemed to be the compromise solution, favorable to both employers and the political class and especially to the local population, maintaining a relatively constant standard of living and avoiding "unwanted" jobs. With mass migration, however, came the "costs" of imported risks: whether we are talking about terrorist attacks or the economic's, political's and diplomatic's costs of military missions in which the European Union has had to participate, all of which can considered to be part of the society's risk.

In addition to physical risks, we must also highlight societal risks that are based on changes in the behavior of individuals as a result of an imbalance between society, nature and science. The change of social values and references as well as the decrease of trust and loyalty in certain institutions corroborated with the orientation towards individualism, have accelerated a degradation of the strength of the population of a state and implicitly of the social identity. Migration and multiculturalism developed around it have systematically contributed to a fragmentation of local identities both by ethno-cultural diversity and by the tendency to separate, defend and promote one's own identity (for example, the case of the Islamic veil has generated multiple debates within French society)

The modernization or the natural evolution of societies cannot be stopped, but the insecurities that burden these stages of modernization can be kept under control using even the mechanisms, institutions and actors of modernity. In the case of immigrants and their integration,

risk management would aim at both an analysis of public policies and the use of tools to attract newcomers to the identity of the majority. Also, European migration policies can only succeed in a scenario of cooperation on the model of rational choice (prisoner's dilemma) or they can completely lose in the absence of aligning a common vision.

Given the scale and dynamism of migration facing the European Union over the last decade and analyzing the individual behavior of states in the latest migration crisis, we believe that solutions for integrating newcomers can be identified in *neofunctional* and *constructivist theories*. Specifically, the European institutions can take a significant part of the responsibility and decision-making power in migration policy from the Member States to ensure a unified capacity to respond, monitor and control the flow of migration followed by an integration strategy that Member States would follow on a local basis. The benefits of this "handover" can be both economic by standardizing and streamlining response measures, and at the diplomatic level as the European Union would look like a single, credible and strong entity. In addition, the constructivist model has already proved in the case of other European policies that it has a faster institutional adaptability, by being able to punctually respond to the challenges facing Member States at a given time (for example: intervention from Brussels in the case of agricultural policy or the influence brought by Common Foreign and Security Policy and its High Representative).

In the *third chapter* I went through a valorization of the most relevant analyzes, studies and theories regarding multiculturalism and how far its limits can be extended in which several identities can co-exist.

Clearly, the challenges and vulnerabilities caused by mass chaotic immigration in such a short period of time have had an important echo in the area of social security, by fostering an ideological, political and social debate within the Member States of the European Union. The cultural, civic and educational differences between European society and the societies of origin of immigrants, strongly fueled by diametrically opposed religions as thinking and manifestation, are the main components in the analysis of migration from the perspective of integration capacity and preservation of European identity.

Some authors have shown that the vulnerabilities generated by migration are closely dependent on the absorption capacity of the host society of a certain number of immigrants as well as the degree of adaptation of newcomers to culture, civilization and the general way of social

organization. On the other hand, the theory of multiculturalism favors the tolerance of ethnocultural differences in the private sphere at the same time as the assimilation by minorities of aspects related to public life. This dual role that both minorities and the host population should play in relation to them, as well as public institutions as the organizer and "arbiter" of this relationship, is often proved to be difficult to be put into practice.

In this context of the comparison between the West and the Arab world, anthropologist Franz Boas showed that perceived differences between societies - technological, artistic innovations, intellectual achievements including intelligence itself - are not genetically determined but are the result of education and culture<sup>8</sup>. In addition to this, the institutions have played a key role in building and developing the values on which European liberal societies are based today. Or in the Arab world, it was religion that dominated the evolution of institutions by shaping civil and political rights and even the economic evolution of states.

Even if at the communication level, multiculturalism has evolved from the model based on the assimilation of the host culture to a model based on the tolerance of the identity of other minorities, in practice I noticed that the level of tolerance claimed was not reached, moreover, in certain moments of crisis we observe a reversal of the degree of tolerance towards immigrants. Besides this, at institutional level, European multiculturalism provides, in addition to civil and political rights, granting the specific rights to minorities in order to protect their identity and facilitate integration under so-called "ethnocultural justice". However, despite these guarantees offered by liberal societies, identity clashes are frequent and exacerbated during crises.

If we refer to the Muslim minorities that are found in the states of the European Union, we will notice that one of the main causes of these identity clashes is based on the confessional factor which actually influences the way society as a whole is viewed: secular versus religious. If linguistic, racial or even behavioral differences can be overcome and even assimilated by the majority society, those that are becoming real obstacles in the process of integration and even tolerance are related to secularism and the role of religion for both parties.

Not only the confessional factor influences the integration process, but also the elements related to traditions, civilizations, the role of the individual in society in relation to its institutions, rights and freedoms or ethical and moral characteristics. Through pluralism, some of these

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The Big Break. Human nature and the restoration of social order*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 180-181.

differences can be tolerated on the condition of reciprocity in the recognition and respect of each other's culture. However, others, such as the components of language learning or respect for the obligations of citizens and the legislation of the host state in which sovereignty is manifested by democratic majorities, do not seem to be tolerated or accepted by the host societies. After all, if the language of the host country is not known, we cannot speak of integration from any point of view and this effort represents a minimum condition from which the limits of tolerance can be negotiated later. Also, respect for human rights and the guarantee of these universal rights in Europe do not coincide with the attribution of certain particular rights in Islamic culture that promote patriarchy, separatism, the preservation and defense of one's identity.

Taking into account the cultural, political and economic monopoly of the majority society, Kymlicka proposes through the theory of ethnocultural justice to ensure an equal cultural affiliation at the level of the expression of individual freedom. Rawls complements the theory by adding the disadvantages faced by minorities in both the public and private spheres, leading to unequal competition. Or this situation triggers another dilemma: the mature and dominant liberal society will feel disadvantaged and even bothered by granting privileged rights to the minority, especially if that minority has a history and low involvement in society or if there is a causal relationship direct between certain acts of violence that public opinion has also felt at the level of identity (eg the case of Charlie Hebdo). Any individual who enjoys the protection of society owes something in exchange for this privilege by assuming and ensuring a certain behavior towards other individuals. In the conduct that individuals have towards each other, it is necessary to follow certain general rules in order to know what to expect<sup>9</sup>.

In order to achieve a smooth and successful level of integration, immigrants need to understand that they must be part of the majority society through loyalty, solidarity and respect for its symbols. Obviously, a "shortcut" to the integration process would amount to an assimilation of the host culture, a situation in which the suspicion of mistrust between communities would be considerably diminished. But as shown, religion and the whole spectrum of values that revolve around Islamic law (sharia) are holding back or even opposing the process of integration through cultural assimilation. Moreover, religious freedom cannot exceed the limits of the values and liberal rights on which European states are founded and these limits must not be confused with the guarantee of religious freedom.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> John Stuart Mill, *About freedom*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, Pp. 111-114.

Another secondary dilemma of migration at European level is maintained by the separation of integration at institutional level from that of de facto, social integration. The legislation of a state can be changed in an extremely short time and can open institutionally certain paths of integration but at a society's level, local population, changes in mentalities, perceptions and acceptance of newcomers do not coincide with the rapid change of legal-institutional framework. There is a need for a whole core of conditions to be aligned and accepted by all parties as soon as possible in order to lay the foundations for integration. If there is no real will or interest in the acceptance and observance of rights and obligations and the host culture by newcomers, we cannot discuss integration, but micro-communities within states that will always pose a potential risk of interethnic, religious or social conflict.

Habermas and Tibi Bassam propose a model of integration based on non-cultural factors in which citizens of different ethnicities and cultures come together under common themes fairly regulated by institutions. However, this model of multiculturalism is purely theoretical at the moment as European societies do not show constant signs of application of this model, even by analyzing the speeches of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010 and former French President Nicholas Sarkozi, we can consider that it is announced even a clearer establishment of the limits of multiculturalism and national identity. Moreover, the immigrant crisis in 2015-2016 also allowed a rise of the extreme nationalism with all the risks it poses for the integration of newcomers.

The danger of exacerbated (intolerant) nationalism is often found alongside the populist discourse directed against migration, assumed by extremist political parties that use the rhetoric of vulnerabilities generated by migration to achieve current electoral goals, by lacking valid arguments. Over the past decade, racism and ethno-cultural discrimination have intensified, and some xenophobic reactions have often been tarnished by a veil of tolerance as long as the state of the economy has been satisfactory or Muslim minorities have not created social conflicts. When we are dealing with a disturbance of the social, economic or identity order and at the end of the "responsibility" are members of the ethnic minority, the populist discourse against migration flourishes and accumulates supporters.

However, the scale and "fuel" of anti-immigration discourse runs through both Western European countries with a solid history of multiculturalism and Eastern states where the transition to democracy is still ongoing. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland from the European Union is perhaps the most eloquent case in which the antiimmigration discourse was the spearhead in the populist rhetoric of "Brexit" but enjoyed the broad support of the majority of British citizens which shows a high degree of credibility. The antiimmigration scourge has also risen in Italy, France, the Netherlands, Hungary or even Denmark and Germany, where political parties that have used this emotional issue have received the support of important masses of citizens. All these examples indicate that there is a revived nationalism in the core of European societies but also a democratic outline of the limits of multiculturalism and the tolerance of ethnocultural minorities.

As prevention is the most effective countermeasure to importing a risk that has caused societal vulnerabilities, *in the fourth chapter* we have analyzed the most important sources and routes of irregular migration, the history and events that fueled mass migration to the European Union, the political-diplomatic, economic and military behavior that the European Union had in the area of the Middle East and North Africa in key moments but also how the learned lessons should be applied in the recorded failures.

If we talk about economic migrants, taking into account current data but also those forecast in terms of natural growth, the European Union certainly needs to import labor from North Africa (Maghreb) or other nearby regions to ensure its deficit resulting from declining birth rates and accelerated aging. However, these migration channels must be sized in accordance with the absorption capacity of the Member States and on the basis of clear regulations setting out the conditions for migration.

Analyzing the way in which the "small Muslim colony" of Western Europe was established, we will notice that, at least in the first part after the Second World War, the entire migration route was not conditioned by a coherent political strategy, but is a natural consequence of covering a need for labor that Western European states sought in the former colonized states or in those with which they had political, economic, or military ties in the past. We must point out that, although Western Europeans have stood out as supporters and practitioners of extended liberalism through popular consultation that gives legitimacy to government action on migration, the citizens of the host states have not been consulted on the identity impact or who can be the limits of the tolerance that the majority Christian population would have shown towards the arrival of such a large number of Muslim immigrants in the post-war period. However, the change in the

socio-political and identity architecture of the host states was impossible to anticipate by Western European governments in the context in which the vacuum of international migration legislation was filled even during the migration process and awareness of identity risks was built only towards late 1970s. More than that, the spontaneous opening of migration channels through family reunification and the consolidation of ethnocultural rights with the second generation, have transformed the issue of migration into a real rubik's cube for policy makers: each facet solved complicates the solution of the others. If the need for labor was met, economic growth was ensured and entrepreneurs were satisfied. Over time, however, the dissatisfaction and frustration accumulated due to poor integration, blocking access to public life or limited access to well-paid jobs coupled with ethnocultural differences incompatible with European secular values put the first bricks that later transformed into identity conflicts which activated in context of crisis and capable of threatening the order and stability of the host states and the European Union as a whole. Moreover, we have shown how the European Union faces an active societal security problem as a result of systematic ignorance around ethnocultural and religious differences and which in turn influences the quality of integration of the Muslim population from North Africa on the Mediterranean route in particular. In the absence of integration, the newly arrived population will feel excluded and will represent a maneuvering mass for anti-Western Muslim propaganda, favoring this way the radicalization as a vector of security risk.

A possible set of solutions that the European Union can adopt should include both ensuring legal migration routes to cover the needs of the workforce and establishing clear policies for their integration in order to avoid the construction of new ethnocultural enclaves. In this way, the tendency of the host population would be to accept newcomers and the immigrants themselves would be aware of the advantages of a loyal approach to the majority population and the values to which it is connected. The interdependence between the provision of labor from migration and the economic needs of migrants must be in a balance without understanding that one party could not survive without the other, but that a possible absolute restriction of immigration would generate a cost that would be too high for both sides<sup>10</sup>.

Other solutions to limit the flow of illegal migration from North Africa and the Middle East would be to complement the political agreements establishing privileged relations between the European Union and the states in the region with mechanisms for economic aid, social

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Keneth N. Waltz, *International political theory*, Polirom publishing House, Iași, 2006, p. 150.

modernization and democratization through which EU institutions can monitor the efficiency and quality of their implementation. Thus, the temptation to migrate would diminish and the means of production in those areas could keep part of the population within their own borders.

Global capitalism has the ability to adapt to a plurality of local religions, cultures and traditions, but this migration crisis has created fear among the European population that the more the European Union opens its borders, the greater the pressure to accept more migrants<sup>11</sup>. In this context of invoking humanitarianism and the favorable economic situation, we cannot help but wonder why the Ummah Muslim community or the Gulf Cooperation Council, made up of the richest states in the Middle East (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman)? Why should the refugee crisis be only a European problem given that many of the neighboring states in the Middle East have consistent natural resources and forms of socio-political organization similar to those of unstable states? On the other hand, there are poor states with weak institutions that host large populations of refugees. For example, a 2016 UNHCR report found that Jordan ranked second in the world in terms of the number of refugees with 90 refugees per thousand inhabitants, with Lebanon in first place with about 209 refugees per thousand inhabitants.

The European Union has no experience in resolving conflicts in the Arab world (see the case of diplomatic failure in Syria and its consequences, the intervention in Afghanistan, etc.) but could use the "weapons" of democracy and the export of "soft" power in an effort to make European values credible among the younger generation of Muslims. At governmental level, it could organize stages of political negotiation around European values in which commitments include the organization of free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, diverse, credible and legitimate media outlets and a dynamic and informed civil society.

In addition, there is a need to maximize the privileged relationship with Turkey as the main ally in order to create a buffer zone between the pressure of migration from the Middle East and the capacity to accept and integrate those seeking to reach one of the Member States of the Union European.

The European Union's refugee and asylum policy should also be supported by a more active involvement of government institutions in the media to combat the manipulation of European citizens, counterbalancing the insistence of xenophobic parties in this effort to adopt the most

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *Refugees, terror and other problems with neighbours*, Cartier Publishing House, Chișinău, 2016, pp. 24-27.

democratic and effective measures to limit irregular migration in conjunction with a fair sharing at Member State level of responsibility for accepting refugees.

The last chapter is structured in two parts and highlights the most relevant characteristics that can influence public perception, policy decision, risks and vulnerabilities generated by the integration model adopted, policies and integration capacity of newcomers and the degree of cooperation and mutual respect reached by ethnocultural minorities in relation to the majority population. Thus, in the first part we analyzed the parallelism of the history of migration, the policies adopted in the field, the typology of immigrants and the consequences of these differences found in the largest and most important countries of the European Union: France and Germany. And the second part includes the interpretation of the case study conducted in Romania in the form of face-to-face interviews with immigrants and refugees (Middle East and Africa) and online questionnaires applied to relevant Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as the General Inspectorate for Immigration as a central institution, in the issue of migration and refugees in Romania.

The analysis of migration and integration difficulties in the *French case* covers the most varied components in this field at European level if we take into account the size and age of the Muslim population in the Republic but also the role of religion in relation to French institutional organization.

It is well known that France has been at the forefront of the revolution rights and the reformation of the Church over the centuries and the shaping of French society has followed a path of respect for these rights and the primacy of institutions in their interpretation. Looking at migration policy in this key, we can identify three types of mistakes that France has made since the 1950s and continues to this day: political-civic, economic-social and identity.

The main political error in the migration equation occurred in the very first years after World War II when the French administration chose to invite workers from the area of North Africa that was part of the French Empire, an area it still controlled, giving them French citizenship and the opportunity for a better life in the effort of post-war economic reconstruction but also as a "reward" for supporting France in the war. Therefore, the colonial experience and the need to cover the need for labor were the basis of a political decision that would take effect 40 years later.

Simple citizenship would not lead to an assimilation of French secular values and conduct, it even meant a societal vulnerability if we take into account the widespread incompatibility between the worlds: Muslim and European. This political error was counterbalanced by the economic need and the "silence" of the first generation of "Maghreb" immigrants who arrived in France without any identity or material claims. Specifically, it was a favorable game for both sides as long as there was mutual satisfaction and there were no clear reasons for a collision of interests.

In the absence of ensuring a level playing field and ignoring cultural characteristics, the French Muslim community has increasingly moved away from the secular values it discovered in the host society and isolated itself within its own cultural boundaries with completely different socio-civic behavior than the French's. Here appears the second important error in the integration policy of France, namely the ignorance or delimitation of recognizing the cultural differences that existed and that began to manifest themselves more and more visibly within the state. The identity recognition of French Muslims was made very late at the official level, only when the identity conflict had the first signs of the clash: the debate around the Islamic veil and the terrorist attacks from the 1980s.

Finally, the third error of integration is also the most sensitive component of the equity and attractiveness of integration as it concerns the financial situation and access to resources. If the first generation of Muslims was easily satisfied from an economic point of view with the fact that they were offered a job (for most newcomers it was also the first job ever accessed), the second generation born and educated in France, she began to understand the importance of rights, claiming the principles of equality that French society itself promoted. In reality, however, as we have shown, access to well-paid jobs has been restricted, often being conditioned by access to education or even ethnicity and skin color. In addition, the physical isolation of the Muslim community in dirty and poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of cities, the French authorities did nothing but incite discrimination, fundamentalism, social inequity and thus a distance from the feeling of belonging and inclusion in French society.

In the last twenty years, many steps have been taken in the process of integrating and limiting the radicalization of the Muslim population in France, but there are still multiple inequities and identity conflicts that maintain a constant societal tension. The current administration is showing signs of understanding the need for dialogue with the Muslim community and could lay the groundwork for agreements, compromises and guarantees that bring the two cultures closer in

terms of both trust and cooperation. School and education in general, but also access to public life or obtaining high-ranking positions can be vital sources for limiting isolation and ensuring integration beyond simple citizenship.

In Germany, the history of migration in recent decades has shown a particular path at the level of the European Union and very different from France. For a more accurate classification of the evolution of migration in the German state, a temporal segmentation is needed, which marks different models and integration characteristics. Thus, the post-war migration needed to restore the lost German labor force in the world conflagration was based on an innovative strategy through which German society could preserve its national identity: the well-known guest worker program (Gastabeiter). Moreover, the origin of these workers was not left to chance, but states were selected whose culture, religion, level of civilization and socio-political reporting were similar to those in Germany (Federal). We must admit that the socio-cultural integration of the first immigrants was achieved in the conditions of cultural, racial, ethnic and religious similarities taking into account their European origin. This aspect contributed decisively to an easy integration but also to an absorption through cooperation as long as the values and the inherited culture had things in common. Unlike France, Germany had no colonial experience so they lacked any possible "moral" ties, routes or obligations, as was the case with France with its former colonies in North Africa.

The orientation of attracting migration towards the German economy was also after 2004 also towards European states, especially from the ten new states that joined the European Union, which indicates a consolidated opinion that Germany's protection of identity has been carefully weighed against the economic benefits of migration.

Although the policies adopted have often contributed to tipping the balance in favor of German nationality, we must highlight the methods of integration used by German leaders through egalitarian reporting in the economic and social sphere while imposing certain conditions of integration such as learning the German language or respecting rights and specific freedoms. The socio-political organization in Germany has ensured equity in the process of economic integration through efficient and non-discriminatory programs, facilitated sustainable assimilation and laid the foundations for a compatibility relationship between the indigenous population and migrant minorities. The economic attractiveness of the German state for immigrants is supported by the prosperity and degree of inclusion that German economic institutions can generate in the sense that the inclusive markets they create can make it easier for people to find employment, according

to the vocations on which also matched them with acquired and natural talents and skills, all in an environment of equal opportunities. In fact, it is also a major attraction for economic immigrants as well as for refugees.

However, the internal debates on the constitutionality of multiculturalism and their resolution in the legal sphere are an important signal that German society is showing on the model of integration it wants to implement as well as the limits of tolerance. In other words, the nation remains a nucleus to which traditions, language, culture, social organization and form of civic representation are linked and the access or connection to this nucleus can be done through a demonstrated attachment to these values, after the first obstacle has been crossed: learning German. We recall that the very granting of German citizenship to the Turkish community even after decades of continuous existence on German territory has produced extensive internal debates, the case also being partially resolved by the Supreme Court, causing multiple dissatisfaction among the Turkish community and maintaining a number of inequalities from the citizenship perspective.

Starting with 2011 and reaching a peak in 2015-2016, the migration crisis has changed the cultural and religious landscape of Germany and the authorities have been forced to respond to important cultural challenges: the elements of language, religion, tradition, education and a completely different social organization of newcomers (especially of Muslim religion) in relation to the German society. The first measures implemented by the German authorities to facilitate integration indicated an optimistic projection regarding the assimilation of German secular components among immigrants, but at this time it is early to analyze the socio-economic and cultural impact of these waves of immigrants, especially since there is a dynamism in the procedures for their expulsion or acceptance depending on the political and legal status of the area of origin. In addition, with the opening of German borders for the largest wave of refugees mixed with economic immigrants in the recent crisis, security risks manifested by terrorist attacks, mass rapes and other acts of violence caused by some of the new arrived ones.

Taking into account the general context of the evolution of migration in Germany compared to France and analyzing the two different integration models, we consider that German integration policies and programs are more favorable to non-discrimination and implicitly to a multicultural circle more inclusive by ensuring fairer economic conditions and a more consistent budgetary allocation in order to access and assimilate the German culture. As explained in previous chapters,

the elimination of integration barriers must be based on a medium- and long-term project with the active involvement of both central and local public authorities, non-governmental organizations and other capable ethno-cultural facilitators able to absorb the elements of separation and to ensure a relationship of cooperation and mutual social and institutional loyalty. In Germany, significant financial resources have been invested in welcoming and integrating those who arrived during the crisis of 2015-2016, but the cultural and religious differences between the new immigrants and German society require close monitoring, especially as they are the basis for violent attacks were mentioned identity and religious elements that seemed incompatible with German secularism and way of life in general.

The interpretation of the results of the *case study conducted in Romania* showed that there are numerous confirmations of the research hypotheses formulated in the preamble of this paper but also multiple novelties that can facilitate integration from a cultural, social, economic or political perspective.

Thus, from a **cultural point of view**, the analysis focused on two segments. On the one hand, the facts that were monitored included the degree of tolerance perceived by refugees and the main factors contributing to their adaptation and integration, and on the other hand, the limits of identity "negotiation" were tested in the sense of willingness to assimilate or preserve the host's culture and defend their own.

Thus, in case of a social, economic or civic problem, the people of the target group indicated that they would prefer in most cases the social networks in the ethnic community to which they belong or the use of specific NGOs. Public institutions are avoided this time and the reason for the reluctance perceived during the interviews is influenced by the conditioning of knowledge of the language, rights but also the fear caused by the lack of previous experience.

The global opinion perceived by the refugees regarding the acceptability within the Romanian society is a favorable one for the integration and the normal social relations towards the newcomers. However, we must specify the fact that in Romania there are no important immigrant communities and those that do exist are mainly concentrated in large cities where the degree of tolerance is higher. Also, Romania has not experienced terrorist assalts or other attacks caused by immigrants, so at this time we can not talk about elements of identity conflict. Moreover, the answer to the question that measures the general degree of satisfaction of the reception in the

Romanian society where 70% are satisfied and 30% very satisfied and taking into account the absence of cases of dissatisfaction, indicates a solid perceptual spectrum of tolerance.

An extremely important graph emerged as a result of questioning the degree of interest in preserving cultural and religious identity in the host society, and the responses showed that for 42% cultural and religious identity is essential while for 47% of respondents it is not a mandatory condition but it is still on the higher scale of importance. Only 10% indicated that they are not interested in the absolute preservation of identity. Even considering Romania a temporary residence space, these data reflect an important attachment of the citizens coming from the Middle East to the religion and culture around it which is completely different from the Romanian and European one in general. As we have argued in previous chapters, religion underlies the most important dissensions between host societies and Muslim immigrant communities as all aspects of social, civic, cultural, economic and even professional organization in an inflexible form revolve around their religion and in sometimes even incompatible with the secular methods found in the states of the European Union.

On the other hand, from the interpretation of the answers of the NGOs and institutions involved in the integration process, it results that the cultural differences and the ignorance of the Romanian language are the main impediments of the integration in the society. These are complemented by a certain reluctance of the local population towards foreigners, especially in regions where their presence is lower.

The major contribution to integration is offered by the presence of acquaintances, relatives or friends from the country of origin on the territory of the adoptive state, the ethnic organizations active on the Romanian territory but also the degree of involvement of each immigrant. This dynamic between the opening of society and the one-person effort for integration (eg learning the Romanian language) can significantly help to improve the integration process. The data show that only 60% show a high interest in learning the Romanian language, while 40% show a superficial interest, which may suggest that there is a short or medium term motivation to stay in Romania.

A relevant conclusion of the answers obtained unanimously showed that the respondents consider that the newcomers must understand and respect the culture of the host society and learn the Romanian language. In addition, the General Inspectorate for Immigration (I.G.I.) considers that they must adopt the fundamental values of the European Union; to know the language of the host country and to contribute actively to the economic and social life of that state. We therefore

observe the drawing of limits of tolerance even by the institutions and organizations directly involved in the first line of the integration effort. These "invisible" limits from a formal point of view can be felt by newcomers as conditions that are difficult to initially accept or difficult to understand anyway. If an individual comes from a completely different environment from the European political system, has a limited or different civilizational baggage from that of the new population with which he interacts and relates to religious values that are diametrically opposed to the secular ones of the host society, the pressure from around refugees even by integration authorities or organizations can mean a handbrake in the integration process.

At the same time, the expectations / demands of newcomers regarding the facilities they should access through local institutions and authorities are generally considered high. These expectations aim the living conditions at medium to high level for a period of at least two years, to be assisted in the process of learning the Romanian language and to obtain a home.

Another relevant conclusion shows that the preservation of cultural and religious identity for newcomers is a very strong indicator while the expectations of the host population are for the assimilation and respect of their own culture as we have shown before. This "clash" of civilizations and cultures can be found throughout the European Union, as we have exemplified in detail in the case of Germany and France, and represents stimuli that generate identity conflicts in the absence of a balanced intervention by public authorities. Currently, given that the number of foreigners is quite low in the local population, the situation in Romania does not present clear risks of conflict over cultural-religious criteria but there is a danger of importing tensions already built in other states, corroborated with threats to spread fanaticism religious and religiously motivated terrorist claims.

From the **economic's integration point of view**, access to the labor market and the degree of schooling / professionalization as well as the vulnerabilities caused by not knowing the Romanian language are the most important indicators in the integration process. Naturally, every individual needs a source of income to ensure a decent living regardless of his gender, ethnicity, race or religion. Achieving financial independence is directly proportional to the expansion of opportunities for integration into a society and, not infrequently, is closely linked to the ability to obtain a well-paid job in a European country of preference. That is why asylum seekers have generally drawn clear destinations for their future and these are states with developed economies and pre-existing ethnic communities.

The present study showed that, in an extremely high proportion, the respondents have a very low professional background, being poorly qualified or even unskilled and this fact will directly influence and achieve a certain success in terms of integration into the labor market is increasingly competitive and the lack of a qualification also leads to a low remuneration which in turn will generate dissatisfaction. In this regard, respondents were somewhat reluctant to disclose how they obtained their first jobs, being prone to unfavorable working conditions or even untaxed work. We must note that the Romanian economy does not offer comparable opportunities with other European countries and the low remuneration related to the level of training is an obstacle in the welfare of a significant part of the Romanian citizens themselves.

In addition to the lack of jobs or low wages, the second obstacle in terms of intensity found in the case of most respondents was related to language impediment. Thus, 90% of the answers indicated the lack of knowledge of the Romanian language as an important barrier in accessing a job. In addition, the same percentage shows that the employment offer of employers is conditioned by the knowledge of the Romanian language. After all, learning the language of the host society is the first step of integration in that society and this fact should not be seen in the mirror with the renunciation of the mother tongue, but strictly from the perspective of access to economic, social, civic, political or cultural life of the host state. The language learning efforts also show the degree of interest that immigrants show in establishing their own path of integration in addition to the cultural embracing facilitated by the knowledge of the language of the host state.

The role and involvement of the Romanian authorities are considered inferior to the contribution and involvement with which private companies are credited when it comes to the concrete help that respondents felt when they tried to get a job but 84% of them said that they were forced to accept a low-paying job because they were foreigners in a form of protection.

The importance of access to the labor market is supported by a complex system of intentions, decisions and indicators that influence the trajectory and success of an immigrant's integration. The combination of satisfaction and the success of integration into a society is found in the equation of specific elements such as: an effective public policy based on a strategy of absorption into the labor market of newcomers with both the role of control and monitoring and also balance, stimulation and anticipation of need. After all, the result can only be a win-win for all parties: rapid integration means a reduction in public costs, a coverage of the labor shortage in certain areas and, implicitly, the achievement of a strengthened sense of belonging and acceptance.

In addition, the potential for delinquency or religious extremism decreases, as the primary needs and the placement of ideals are sufficient in that context for a migrant to feel part of the future of that society.

From the point of view of NGOs and specialized institutions, the main obstacles in entering the labor market are caused by the lack of knowledge of the Romanian language and the absence of diplomas or professional qualifications to which are added cultural preconceptions from discriminatory employers. Also, the practice confirms that informal networks are preferentially used in the effort to find a job and less the offer provided through local public authorities - County Employment Agencies (AJOFMs).

Although work permits are issued in a timely manner according to the answers analyzed, it was found that the main problem is access to a stable job, although IGI acknowledges that people that belong to any form of protection do not have access to the labor market as per the legal framework that is harmonized with the European requirements. The I.G.I also concluded that there are a number of reasons why these people have limited access to the labor market for objective and subjective reasons such as: lack of documents attesting a certain profession or school training; the actual lack of any form of school preparation; distrust of Romanian employers in foreigners; far too high expectations of foreigners for pay; poor knowledge by Romanian employers of the legislation by which they can hire people from the target group; the people's disinterest in the target group in accepting the performance of unskilled work.

The I.G.I also acknowledges that persons in a form of protection do not generally turn to the authorities for employment or qualification in a particular field, but prefer the support of friends, relatives or acquaintances. Moreover, this fact emerges from a study conducted by the Research Institute for Quality of Life at the request of the Romanian National Council for Refugees which states that: "integration into the labor market is hampered especially by the lack of language skills and jobs are identified with the help of other refugees, members of the ethnic community or, in isolated cases, with the help of NGOs ".

From a **social point of view**, the interpretation of the data showed that access to public social services and interaction with Romanian society in general are assimilated to a favorable opinion among the interviewed refugees. Even if the analysis was based on the answers of a majority group of refugees who arrived in Romania less than two years ago and their interactions

with public services such as health or education were limited, no elements of discrimination were found, this opinion being supported. by the surveyed institutions as well.

However, when it comes to access to a private home or to the accommodation conditions offered by the Romanian authorities, the answers of the interviewed refugees show a deep dissatisfaction. There has been widespread discrimination in access to housing and a marked deterioration in some institutional reception centers for refugees. In fact, the need to improve accommodation facilities is also recognized by the institution that manages them, namely I.G.I. and other NGOs note a direct link between the feeling of belonging / social integration and ensuring better conditions for refugees.

In terms of social integration facilitators, citizens of the same ethnicity who are on the national territory with whom socio-human relations are established or with other close ethnocultural organizations to the detriment of the proximity to the host population are still preferred, the reasons being the lack of speaking Romanian, of the knowledge of the Romanian culture and way of life and even of a cultural reluctance.

The integration at the **political-civic level** reiterated what is happening in all European states among the Muslim communities, respectively a generalized inactivity. The main causes that maintain a distance between the proximity of institutions, the assumption of a public role or the involvement in the citizen life are divided in two distinct categories. On the one hand we have the system of socio-civic values completely different from the one that Muslims know from the states of origin and quite incompatible with their political "heritage" based on the role and influence of religion and clan / tribal regional organization. On the other hand, there is a wall with physical obstacles in the area of tools that can be used and that can be overcome by newcomers and here we can exemplify learning the Romanian language, approachability and involvement of various institutions, knowledge of rights, obligations and customs Romanian society, etc.

The new European identity based on a self-criticism of reason and openness to the plurality of world cultures - *unitas multiplex*<sup>12</sup> needs a political consensus at the level of decision makers to establish the limits of tolerance and the capacity to absorb and integrate newcomers. The Member States of the European Union must update their political dimension to reporting to foreigners by branching out the concepts that will dictate the European public agenda in the coming decades: differentiated assimilation, libertarian multiculturalism, tolerance limits and state cohesion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Edgar Morin, *Penser l'Europe*, European Institute Publishin House, Iași, 2007, p. 194.

Knowledge and interpretation of mass migration methods can help to foreshadow the societal security architecture of the near future of the European Union and can refine the mechanisms of integration and ensure a balance between the economic need arising from human migration and the capacity to absorb cultural identity of the migrants.

When we talk about controlled migration (even if it involves humanitarian crises and refugees) the most appropriate solution is found in integration. But, as we have observed, the integration of a group of completely culturally different individuals from the host society can trigger identity conflicts and implicitly can generate vulnerabilities for societal security.

Integration looks like a complex equation with many unknowns and the solution of which requires a long time, the willingness to negotiate and mutual ethnocultural compromise. Successful integration is a dual effort, shared between the host society and immigrants, and involves responsibilities as follows: the immigrant must assimilate and use the language spoken in the host state; to respect the culture, values and legislation of the adoptive state and to show institutional loyalty; to be actively involved in civic and social life in order to ensure trust and closeness to the majority population while limiting enclavement. In return, the host society and its leaders must ensure a level playing field for immigrants in all public services and non-discriminatory access to the labor market; to protect and respect culture and ethnic differences as well as the freedoms of religious expression within the constitutional-legislative limits and the values according to which the respective society is guided. The arbitration of solving this equation is provided by the host state and can be manipulated by the subjectivism of the majority. That is why the involvement and role of the European institutions, of specialized Non-Governmental Organizations and other relevant actors can ensure a balance in this integration process where mutual expectations can be patiently achieved: "Traveler", says a Spanish proverb, "there are no path. Paths are made by walking"<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, All Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 727.