



UNIUNEA EUROPEANĂ



Fondul Social European
POSDRU 2007-2013



Instrumente Structurale
2007-2013



OIPOSDRU

MINISTERUL
EDUCAȚIEI ȘI
CERCETĂRII
ȘTIINȚIFICE



SNSPA
Școala Națională de
Studii Politice și
Administrative

Investeste în oameni!

FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN

POS DRU 2007-2013 - Axa prioritară 1: „Educația și formarea profesională în sprijinul creșterii economice și dezvoltării societății bazate pe cunoaștere”

Domeniul major de intervenție: 1.5 „Programe doctorale și post-doctorale în sprijinul cercetării”

Numărul de identificare al contractului: **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650**

Titlul proiectului: **„Burse doctorale și postdoctorale pentru tineri cercetători în domeniile Științe Politice, Științe Administrative, Științele Comunicării și Sociologie”**

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ARENA SENTER FOR EUROPAFORSKNING, UNIVERSITETET I OSLO

An EU Maritime Security Policy in the Making: The Case of Military CSDP Operations at Sea

Ph.D. Thesis Summary

Ruxandra – Laura BOȘILCĂ

Supervised by:

Prof. Univ. Dr. Ioan Mircea PAȘCU

National University of Political Sciences and Public Administration, Bucharest

Dr. Marianne RIDDERVOLD

ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo

Bucharest, 2017

Over the past decade, we have assisted at a remarkable ascendancy of the EU as a maritime security actor, with a growing expansion of its policy reach both geographically and across different issue-areas. These rapid and sweeping developments are startling, considering that the protection of the seas has been traditionally a domain réservé of states. As previously shown, these have strenuously defended the freedom and security of the seas in order to pursue their military-strategic interests, gain unimpeded access to key maritime routes for trade and transportation, and assert historical rights beyond their territorial seas.

If states associate the maritime sphere with core national interests – and are thus expected to be less inclined to tolerate supranational encroachments on their jurisdiction – then *how can we explain the growing maritime security cooperation inside the EU?* Simply put, *why have member states agreed to work together in such a politically sensitive area?* And closely related, *which are the main factors accounting for the rapidly expanding maritime dimension of the CSDP?* Finally, on a more general level, *what can we learn about the EU collective action in the realm of security?*

To answer these questions, I chart the incremental development of the EU maritime security dimension in order to delineate the major factors driving cooperation forward across different maritime security policies; to examine the role of various actors in crafting such policies; and to identify the critical junctures marking these developments. I devote special attention to what I claim to be the most difficult cases of cooperation, namely the decisions to deploy two naval military operations under the CSDP: a counter-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean (EUNAVFOR Atalanta), and a maritime interdiction operation against migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia), respectively. The research also reveals how the EU's gradual policy expansion in the maritime domain has already influenced its status as a regional and global security provider. In addition, it sheds light on the broader questions of what motivates member states and EU actors to take collective action in the security field; how security policies are articulated and framed; and ultimately, what is the nature of the EU as a contributor to international security.

This study is unique in several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, it represents the first monograph dedicated entirely to the maritime security policy of the EU from an International Relations (IR)/EU studies perspective. A second element of novelty resides in the comparative perspective used to examine the two naval operations launched by the Union

so far. While operation Atalanta was examined by various authors, Sophia has received considerably less attention; also, no theoretically-based analysis sought to compare and contrast them until now. At last, through a better understanding of security cooperation in the maritime field, the research adds to the existing explanations of the security integration process in the EU.

The thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter 1 begins by providing a brief overview of the issue of maritime security in the EU context and by outlining the relevance of the research topic.

Within the span of the past decade, the EU has considerably expanded its maritime policy scope across a multitude of areas including the marine environment, fisheries, maritime transport, the 'blue' economy, renewable energy and numerous others, which are now streamlined into an integrated maritime policy. Recently, the Union has put forth global-reaching ambitions in its first ever maritime security strategy, and has asserted a prominent role in the governance of the world's seas and oceans through a global strategy for its foreign and security policy. By now, it has become a widely-acknowledged security contributor at sea, both internally and externally, by taking on crucial tasks such as maritime surveillance and information sharing, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, the fight against organised crime, migration control, environmental protection, fisheries conservation, energy security, disaster prevention and response, and maritime capacity building.

Since 2007, the EU has extended its influence across all major European sea basins through regional strategies in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, the Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the North Sea, the Arctic, and its outermost regions (European Commission, 2016a). The Union has also developed a dense web of bilateral and multilateral partnerships on different dimensions of maritime security, hence enhancing its political clout on the global stage. Moreover, the EU is deeply embedded in the global regime governing security and safety at sea: it became a party of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) along its member states, and although it is not a full member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), most EU countries have ratified the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR).

Additionally, more often than not, the EU speaks with one voice inside the IMO by

informally coordinating the positions of its member states (Pape, 2016). Equally relevant, the EU is increasingly engaging with domestic and foreign audiences to raise the visibility of its maritime sector. It has achieved this through information hubs and communication platforms (such as the *European Atlas of the Seas* and the *Maritime Forum*); public campaigns explaining its sea-related activities in dedicated booklets, website and social media content; a specialised magazine issued by the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) on a monthly basis; thematic conferences, seminars, and workshops; as well as political dialogues with third countries (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016a). Moreover, the Union has worked hard towards the consolidation of a shared conscience of European ‘maritimeness’ by creating an annual European Maritime Day and by building a self-narrative around the naval and maritime history of the continent (European Commission, 2006).

Last but not least, member states have collectively launched so far two naval operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), mandated to fight piracy off the coasts of Somalia, and to disrupt migrant smuggling networks in the Mediterranean, respectively. A civilian mission tasked to consolidate the maritime security capacity of Somalia is also in place (European External Action Service, 2016).

As the examples above illustrate, EU policy developments in the realm of maritime security are advancing at a fast pace and show no signs of slowing down. More recently, a Joint Communication on international ocean governance drafted by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter the ‘High Representative’) reiterated the position of the EU as a ‘strong global actor’ at sea, echoing the confident wording of previous policy declarations (European Commission and the High Representative, 2016b, p. 4). Earlier that year, the European Commission and the High Representative launched an integrated policy for the Arctic, which is indicative for the sweeping maritime aspirations of the Union, even in highly contested waters such as the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas (European Commission and the High Representative, 2016c). Similarly bold initiatives followed suit. In September 2016, the EU set up its new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) in response to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean, by revamping Frontex and extending its competences to include, not without controversy, a right to initiate joint operations and a stronger obligation for

states to contribute to a ‘rapid reaction pool’ at the Agency’s disposal (European Parliament and the Council, 2016).

These illustrations of the EU’s active involvement in maritime affairs across numerous policy fields and institutional fora are puzzling and raise a number of points which invite a more detailed study of the topic.

The *first* and most striking aspect is the pervasive presence of the Union in different maritime security spheres traditionally associated with the sovereign prerogatives of member states, such as surveillance and naval operations. The states’ tendency to vehemently reject any intrusion in security and defence matters is likely to be further exacerbated in the maritime domain, where they hold key strategic and economic interests. In addition, due to the different history, geography and strategic outlook of each country, such interests are not easy to reconcile; major EU member states (notably France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) are also leading maritime powers, with enduring naval traditions and global sea interests, which arguably makes a convergence of positions on maritime security even less likely. Cooperation inside the EU is further complicated by the fact that maritime security extends across multiple policy areas and institutional settings, which leads to inevitable tensions between the intergovernmental and supranational levels.

The *second* point stems from the paramount importance of the sea for the EU security, which clearly transcends military aspects; as a result, terrorism, piracy, irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, marine environmental degradation and resource depletion, climate change, natural and man-made disasters, the destruction of the maritime cultural heritage, and the vulnerability of coastal communities – are all salient issues on the EU agenda.

A *third* observation is related to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, which created high expectations of an enhanced coherence and coordination of policies and instruments inside the Union. As a result, in the maritime domain, the Union exerts *exclusive* competences in ‘the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy’ (Art. 3 (1) TFEU); *shared* competences in ‘fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources’, environment, transport, energy, and the area of freedom, security and justice (Art. 4 para. (2) TFEU); as well as competences to *support, coordinate or complement* the actions undertaken by member states in areas such as the conservation of the maritime cultural heritage, or the provision of disaster relief aid to

vulnerable populations including coastal inhabitants and migrants in distress at sea under the banner of civil protection (Art. 6 TFEU). Moreover, as the EU was conferred legal personality, it can now conclude international agreements to become a full member in international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), or to join treaty regimes, like in the case of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Furthermore, the creation of a new, 'double-hatted' position of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, backed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) provided the opportunity for more consistency between the 'Community' and the intergovernmental policy fields, and for a more coherent external representation of the EU. In addition, more room for manoeuvre was given to 'willing and able' states through the extension of the qualified majority voting rule in the CFSP, as well as through the development of novel instruments, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the enhanced cooperation procedure, and the flexibility mechanism.

A *fourth* point stems from the interest of external actors in the way the Union contributes to global maritime governance, as shared concerns about borderless threats prompted the need for more cooperation and coordination. Such actors include *third countries* working closely with the EU on counter-piracy, counter-smuggling, the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, or marine environmental protection, such as the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, and many more; *international organisations and bodies*, as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Labour Organization (ILO), or the International Criminal Policy Organization (INTERPOL); *regional organisations*, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc.; *associated countries* participating in CSDP operations, including Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Ukraine, etc; as well as the *beneficiaries* of these security measures, such as the countries fringing the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Guinea, or the Southern Mediterranean.

A *fifth* and final point refers to the importance of an enhanced public awareness about the EU's maritime dimension for the domestic and external perception of its role as a security

actor. First of all, by proving itself a meaningful contributor to the regional and global maritime security, the Union managed to increase its international leverage and to expand its security tasks in ways which exceeded its original commitment. For instance, after actively fighting Somali piracy since 2008, the Union was entrusted in January 2014 with the chairmanship of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the main governance site coordinating the international response to piracy in the region. This mandate, carried out jointly by the European Commission and the EEAS, offered an unprecedented opportunity for the Union to assume a leading role in steering the global efforts to combat piracy, as well as to raise its own political visibility. Second, a demonstrated ability in protecting the seas enables the EU to support other security contributors, while also reinvigorating partnerships with key states or organisations. A telling example is the EU-NATO cooperation on counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean, migration control in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, and information sharing at sea. Such initiatives increased the effectiveness of the two organisations in performing their respective tasks, while also acting as a catalyst for their often stagnating partnership by shifting the attention towards cooperation in definite areas (President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO, 2016). Third, perceptions are inextricably linked to the *problématique* of internal and external legitimacy, in other words to the way in which the EU is collectively assessed by its constituency, namely by member states and European citizens, on the one hand, and the broader international community, on the other hand.

Following these introductory remarks, the first chapter proceeded to define the notion of ‘maritime security’ in the particular context of the EU. In the absence of a generally agreed understanding of the term, the thesis drew insights from the literature on security and on the specific features of the EU’s external action in order to advance a working definition of the notion. As a result, I defined maritime security as *the active management of threats and opportunities at sea through which the EU aims to advance and protect its own interests and those of its member states; enhance the prosperity of its citizens and the resilience of European societies; and shape a peaceful external environment based on stability, rule of law, and the protection of human lives and livelihoods, by using a wide range of political, diplomatic, military, civilian, development and humanitarian tools.*

Without claiming universal validity, this interpretation of maritime security presents several advantages. First, the definition captures the active process of ‘maritimisation’ through which the EU has expanded its security policy portfolio and has set up new regulations, structures and partnerships to support these policies. This understanding contrasts with negative definitions of the concept which attempt to explain maritime security as an uncritical listing of identified threats at sea (i.e. maritime territorial disputes, piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, pollution, cultural heritage looting, etc.). It also differs from the definition of maritime security as a ‘stable’ or ‘good order’ of the seas as a result of effective law enforcement, an approach which remains vague and focused only on the end result to the detriment of the process. Second, it reflects the plurality of referent objects secured under the EU maritime policies, including the Union as a whole, the individual member states, the EU citizens and societies, as well as third-country nationals. Third, this understanding provides a glimpse into the core values underpinning the measures adopted by the EU in the maritime domain, such as peace, security, stability, legality, good governance, and human rights. Fourth, the definition illustrates the diversity of instruments and tools at the EU’s disposal to defend its interests and respond to security threats at sea, reflecting its comprehensive approach to security.

Following these conceptual clarifications, the chapter went on to examine in more depth the importance of the sea for the EU security, by placing the discussion into the broader European historical context. As shown, the legacy of prominent seafaring civilisations, such as the Minoans, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Norsemen; the emergence of the powerful city-states of Venice, Genoa and Pisa in the Mediterranean, rivalled by the Hanseatic League in the Baltic and North Sea; the Age of Reconnaissance opening the way towards territorial discoveries, new maritime routes, and colonial empires; the thriving century of Pax Britannica; the critical role of the seas in defending the European security during the two World Wars; as well as the salient contributions of European states to the development of maritime law and the creation of a new oceans regime under UNCLOS – represent key milestones which have shaped the European history and civilisation. The EU is no exception to this tradition. With its 23 coastal states, extensive maritime borders, and approximately half of its population living close to the shores, the security of the Union and of its member states is inseparably linked to the sea in numerous ways. To quote but a few

examples, the EU depends on a safe and secure maritime milieu to defend its borders and project power, develop its 'blue economy', protect its shipping and crew, ensure its energy security, enhance the resilience of coastal dwellers in the face of natural and man-made disasters, and safeguard its rich maritime heritage.

At last, the remainder of the chapter provided a critical reading of the emerging literature on maritime security, noting the progress achieved so far and identifying the remaining gaps.

Unlike other policy fields, maritime affairs have received considerably less attention in the EU studies and IR literature. An extensive body of work has examined in great detail a multitude of EU policy domains, including agriculture, environment, transportation, health, energy, regional policies, economic and monetary affairs, competition, industry, culture, research and innovation, justice and home affairs, aid and development, enlargement, trade, as well as foreign affairs and security; in a nutshell, virtually all major areas of EU interest are covered. In comparison, maritime matters have been largely absent from the bulk of EU studies, perhaps with the exception of the more burgeoning literature on fisheries (Lequesne, 1999, 2004; Bretherton and Vogler, 2008; Churchill and Owen, 2010; Penas Lado, 2016; Wakefield, 2016) and maritime transportation policies (Bredima-Savopoulou, 1990; Pallis, 2002; Christodoulou-Varotsi, 2009).

At least three distinct, yet closely interconnected explanations account for these striking omissions.

First, the idea of an EU maritime policy understood holistically is a fairly recent innovation. Different from older and more established areas of policy-making in which the EU has traditionally exerted a compelling influence – such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the competition policy, or the trade policy – a full-fledged maritime policy only came into being with the adoption of an Integrated Maritime Policy in 2007. In a broad sense, almost all EU policy areas comprise a maritime dimension, which is reflected in the cross-sectoral character of maritime affairs: the fields of energy, environment, climate change, transportation, trade, regional policy, health, research and innovation, foreign and security affairs, and culture all carry a strong sea-related component. As a result, disparate maritime elements have often been incorporated into the discussion of other policy areas, which led to a lack of clarity about the field's substance. In turn, this hampered the development of a distinct body of literature on maritime affairs, by calling into question the delimitation of the

topic from other areas of inquiry.

A second reason for which maritime issues were neglected in the literature is that the scholarly and policy interest in the maritime security of the EU has only emerged over the last decade. Unless exceptionally noteworthy, the topics of piracy, terrorism at sea, smuggling and trafficking do not attract significant interest outside the maritime community or the rather restraint group of scholars studying maritime security. The EU literature has closely followed policy developments, hence the first systematic efforts to study the Union's response to the emerging security threats at sea after the Cold War largely coincided with the Commission's announced agenda for an integrated maritime policy in 2005.

Finally, a third explanation is that research on the subject of EU maritime affairs has usually focused on the study of fisheries and maritime transportation policies. Historically, both policies have occupied a central role in the European construction, which arguably explains why these areas of investigation have been privileged. However, even a cursory glance reveals a much more complex reality where the maritime domain involves a myriad of discrete dimensions. On that account, a plausible argument could be made that this conceptual oversimplification has rendered the topic of maritime affairs less attractive for those scholars holding a limited interest in fisheries or transportation matters.

Against this backdrop of 'sea blindness', or neglect of maritime affairs, the more specific issue of maritime security has been largely treated as exogenous to the IR and EU works. Three main stumbling blocks have hampered the development of a vigorous research agenda on the topic, namely the confusion surrounding the actual significance of the concept of maritime security; the tendency to overlook the specific traits of the sea relative to the terrestrial environment; as well as the recent character of the EU's maritime security policies, which have not occupied an important place on the political agenda of the Union until little time ago.

The emerging literature dedicated to maritime security includes, inter alia, various publications issued or commissioned by the EU; a burgeoning number of studies which touch upon the development of different maritime security policy fields within the EU, including counter-piracy (Riddervold, 2011; Koutrakos and Skordas, 2014; Kaunert and Zwolski, 2014; Knutsen and Dønjar, 2016), marine environmental protection (Brandt, 2006; Frank, 2007; Gilek and Kern, 2016), and seafaring safety and security (Riddervold and Sjørusen, 2012;

Delarue, 2013); as well as different academic and policy studies providing analyses of the EU regional policies in the Mediterranean (Gomez, 1998; Cardwell, 2009; Wolff, 2012; Bauer, 2015a, 2015b; Bicchi, 2002), the Baltic (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012; Mälksoo, 2006), the Adriatic (Belt, Chapsos and Samardžić, 2013; Cugusi and Stocchiero, 2016), the North Sea (Danson, 2016), the Arctic (Offerdal, 2011; Wegge, 2012), the Black Sea (Fischer, 2010; Nițoiu, 2012), the Atlantic (Wise, 2016), the Indian Ocean (van der Putten, Wetzling and Kamerling, 2014; Rogers, 2013), and the South China Sea (Duchâtel and Huijskens, 2015).

However, despite their valuable contribution to understanding the trajectory of specific dimensions of maritime security in different regional settings, these works fall short of providing an overarching perspective on the general development of the field, and often result in fragmented or isolated accounts of the process.

The present study attempted to remedy the observed shortcomings in the literature under three main aspects. To begin with, I outlined a detailed chronicle of the development of maritime security policies in the context of the EU, which charted the incremental process through which the maritime security dimension was shaped. Second, to uncover the mobilising factors leading to cooperation at sea, I advanced three theoretically-informed hypotheses which focused on power, economic, and normative explanations. Thirdly, I applied these assumptions to two striking instances of cooperation, specifically the two naval operations conducted by the EU within the CSDP. As the use of military force is generally seen as the last bastion of national sovereignty, looking at the first operations launched at sea under the aegis of the EU casts additional light on the limits of security integration in the maritime domain. Altogether, these aspects contributed to a more fine-grained understanding of the EU response to contemporary security threats.

Starting from these preliminary observations, the next four chapters sought to examine the reasons why and the process through which the EU has gradually developed its maritime security dimension.

With this purpose in mind, *Chapter 2* traced the origins and the trajectory of maritime security cooperation inside the EU, focusing on the main policy developments occurring between 2001 and 2014, when the topic of maritime security captured and retained the attention of European policy makers.

In concrete terms, the chapter outlined four distinct, yet closely connected stages of this

evolution.

During a first stage, which preceded the formal creation of the ESDP/CSDP, Western European navies developed a close cooperation and coordination under various bilateral and multilateral settings, through joint maritime exercises and operations, information sharing and exchange of best practices, which fostered a sense of mutual dependency and trust.

A second stage, triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and a series of intensely mediatised assaults against civilian and military ships, marked the growing salience of maritime security issues at the national and EU levels. At this point, the European Commission, acting through its extensive competences and powers in the field of transport, carved out a key role for itself in shaping the scope and content of nascent maritime security policy.

A third stage, which began with the adoption of a Green Paper on a future maritime policy for the EU in 2006 and the release of a 'Blue Book' on an integrated maritime policy a year later, marked a gradual shift in focus from 'blue growth' to maritime security issues, *via* the Union's growing interest in maritime surveillance and information sharing. While the first related documents issued by the Commission and the Council were centred almost entirely on economic and social aspects in the maritime sector, the need to curb illegal activities at sea led to an intensified exchange of information among different EU bodies and national authorities in areas such as defence, safety and security, fisheries, border control, customs, and marine protection.

At last, the fourth stage was marked by the publication of an EU Maritime Security Strategy in 2014, which represented a major breakthrough for the Union's ambitions to become a global maritime player. If until then maritime security issues had received only tangential attention, the strategy explicitly acknowledged the vital importance of the sea for the European security, and signalled the EU's commitment to play a global security role commensurate with its economic strength in maritime affairs. The path leading up to the strategy was sinuous and lengthy, with moments of effervescence alternating with periods of stagnation. Put forward by the Spanish Presidency of the Council during the first semester of 2010, the idea was initially rejected by the Commission for its over-militarised emphasis, and also for interfering with its competences in shipping, port security, migration and border control; moreover, several member states showed reluctance to approve such a proposal. The

deadlock was eventually broken by shifting the negotiation venue from member states to the Commission and the EEAS, which were quick to take the lead. The initial hesitancy was overcome as a result of two significant developments in the security environment, which aroused renewed interest in maritime security and facilitated consensus-building: the worsening migration crisis in the Mediterranean, and Russia's military intervention in Crimea.

Chapter 3 laid out the theoretical and methodological framework for the subsequent analysis.

The EU as an international actor, as well as the formulation and implementation of its foreign and security policies have attracted an intense academic interest. Especially after the mid-1980s, a burgeoning literature set out to assess the distinctive nature of the EU as a nascent security actor in the international arena, its influence in the realm of 'soft' and 'traditional' security alike, and the extent to which it was gradually borrowing the attributes of a state-like entity apt to fulfil crucially important security functions in its neighbourhood and into the wider world.

The emergence of a large and vibrant literature focused on the CSDP can be explained by at least four distinct reasons.

First, the Union's failure to respond to the first major post-Cold War security challenge in its neighbourhood – the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation in the 1990s – created a context which forced member states to reassess the state of the European defence, bringing into sharp focus the need for an autonomous security and defence capacity (Howorth and Keeler, 2003).

Second, the rapid expansion of the EU's reach into the most sensitive area of national sovereignty provided a provoking puzzle for the observers of European integration: the states' decision to establish a common security and defence policy marked a change of first magnitude, given the persistent rejection of past initiatives in this regard. Since the 1990s, the European security architecture has undergone an unprecedented process of extended cooperation and intensified integration which exceeded the scope of collective territorial defence to incorporate a growing number of 'out of area' deployments. Without replacing the transatlantic structures of NATO, member states have institutionalised their cooperation in the field of security and defence under the CSDP, as a complementary and parallel forum of

consultation and joint action. Hence, the CSDP ‘transforms, or at least challenges, the perception of the traditional state and defence by bringing a new reflection on European integration and national/European security’ (Larivé, 2014, p. 3).

Third, the EU’s quick steps from a civilian to a militarised actor sparked vivid debates about its evolving nature and role in international affairs. The dichotomy between ‘civilian’ and ‘military power Europe’ has long been a leitmotif of the scholarship on the EU security and defence policy, which can be traced back to the enduring debate between Duchêne and Bull in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Duchêne, 1972, 1973; Bull, 1982). While recent works have drawn attention to the misleading and artificial character of this distinction, the framing remains nonetheless a long-lived point of reference for alternative categorisations (Chilton, 1995; Sjørusen, 2006; Steward, 2006; Elgstrom and Smith, 2006).

Fourth and lastly, the CSDP emerged as a ‘real-world laboratory in which theories can be tested’, each leading to ‘very different explanations of the causes and workings of the CSDP and very different predictions of where it is headed’ (Merlingen, 2012, p.3). While during its first decade of existence the CSDP largely remained under-theorised and descriptive, the more recent literature has acknowledged its potential as a fertile area of inquiry for EU and IR scholars alike (Norheim-Martinsen, 2015; Larivé, 2014; Rodt, 2014; Kurowska, 2012).

While a vast body of literature has examined the drivers of cooperation inside the CSDP, many of these work lack a firm theoretical foundation – and even when their analytical rigour is demonstrable, they nonetheless tend to favour mono-theoretical explanations, or to examine the deployment of operations in disconnection from wider policy developments. Also, no theoretically-informed study has dedicated special attention to the maritime dimension of the CSDP until now.

This thesis has suggested that theoretically-informed explanations derived from the major paradigms in IR, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism, can shed light on why and when member states decide to jointly conduct military operations under the aegis of the CSDP. Specifically, I turned my attention to the tenets of Waltz’s variant of neorealism; Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism; and finally, Manners’ ‘normative power Europe’ model and Kaldor’s reflections on EU human security, which can be loosely grouped under the constructivist school of thought. Rather than claiming a priori the prevalence of a certain theoretical approach, I embrace Walt’s view that ‘each of these competing perspectives

captures important aspects of world politics', thus 'our understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined to only one of them' (Walt, 1998, p. 44). Distinct 'analytical building blocks' reveal different aspects of cooperation in the foreign and security policy of the EU, thus their aim should be to complement the existing approaches, rather than replace them (Sjursen, 2003, p. 34).

The selected approaches are also representative for the two major meta-theoretical frameworks for analysis in the study of the EU, rationalism and constructivism, which have long been 'the main site of contention in IR theory' (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 4; Pollack, 2001; Tallberg, 2003; Sicurelli, 2016). While these are characterised by 'a set of (mainly ontological) assumptions about the social world rather than by specific hypotheses', a multitude of substantial theories have been developed based on rationalist or constructivist propositions, advancing different explanations of preferences and outcomes in international politics, and revealing distinct aspects of European integration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 508).

Despite embodying rival explanations of EU politics, realism and liberal intergovernmentalism can be clustered under a rational research programme, which represents 'a distinctive family of approaches to the study of the EU' based on two shared assumptions, namely the centrality of states in European integration and the utility-maximizing nature of the actors (Pollack, 2012, p. 3). Following this line of thought, individual agents are self-interested actors with fixed preferences, choosing to pursue a certain course of action among many other available options based on their cost-benefit calculations, and taking into account the institutional and strategic constraints on their behaviour (Pollack, 2006; Olson, 1965; Parsons, 2005). However, agents may choose to comply with norms for instrumental rationales, in order to avoid social and material costs associated with a loss of credibility, trust, or legitimacy at the domestic and external levels (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Brennan et al, 2013). In this context, international organisations are seen as mere instruments which help states advance their self-regarding interests more efficiently by reducing transaction costs, rather than being purposeful actors per se. Specifically, these provide a stable and neutral framework which facilitates the negotiation and implementation of agreements, the resolution of disputes, the pooling of resources, as well as the elaboration of common rules (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Opposing this view, constructivist approaches posit instead that the actors' identities and interests are not given, but constantly (re)constructed through social interaction. As norms become internalised, actors are driven by an intrinsic 'logic of appropriateness' which reflects their belief that a certain course of action is conform to their identity; therefore, actors develop a social or shared interest in upholding the norms to which they adhere, as these become part of a wider collective identity (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 160; Wendt, 1999; Adler, 2013). As a result, international organisations embody relatively stable sets of intersubjective norms and practices, which exert influence over states by defining appropriate behaviour, creating novel interests, and establishing new international tasks (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 699).

These perspectives provide different potential explanations for the creation of a maritime security dimension inside the EU. Briefly, according to the neorealist assumptions, member states and EU actors are expected to act together in order to protect and advance their strategic-security interests in the maritime sphere, regionally and globally (Waltz, 1979; Hyde-Price, 2012). In exchange, the liberal perspective brings into attention the salience of economic interests: simply put, actors have a strong material incentive to launch common initiatives due to the high costs entailed by unilateral measures and the complexity of the security challenges requiring concerted action in an interdependent environment (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2001). In both cases, actors are primarily guided by rational cost-benefit calculations, while normative arguments are used for instrumental purposes. Finally, in line with the constructivist-based tenets, actors are motivated by normative or humanitarian considerations, such as promoting good governance, protecting human rights, and strengthening human security, in conformity with the Union's *sui generis* nature in international politics (Manners, 2002, 2009; Kaldor, 2012).

In terms of *methodology*, the analysis combines distinct qualitative case study methods and data sources.

The first method employed is the cross-case comparison, which means that a general set of theory-derived questions or hypotheses is applied to the selected cases in order to obtain comparable data, which is then systematically examined for the purposes of the study (George and Bennett, 2004). Widely applied in qualitative studies of the EU, case studies are particularly well-suited for descriptive purposes, depicting a rich illustration of the context

and of the nature of the phenomenon under observation, while also being useful for in-depth examinations of causal relations. The thesis employed cases for combined intrinsic and instrumental rationales: in other words, both for their empirical importance per se, as well as for serving the purpose of revealing broader aspects about the subject under examination (Stake, 2005).

The topic of EU maritime security is inherently vast. With the expanded definition of security beyond questions of seapower, naval strategies and territorial protection, and the increasing blurring between internal and external security, we assist at a growing complexity of the subject. Additional difficulties of studying the topic stem from the rapidly growing policy and institutional framework related to maritime security, which cuts across a plurality of sectors. This being said, a balance between parsimony and comprehensiveness is not only desirable, but also necessary in order to maintain the scope of the research manageable. Each of the above-mentioned facets of maritime security, and still other, could become the subject of a distinct monograph. As a book-length study could not do justice to a thorough examination of all related aspects, I focused on the 'least-likely cases' of maritime security cooperation, namely the two EU-led naval operations launched so far. These, I claim, represent 'hard cases' given the member states' expected reluctance to agree to collectively engage in military operations at sea. The CSDP, placed under the formal control of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, remains dominated by an intergovernmental logic where states retain their power over the decision-making process, given the unanimity rule. Although member states eventually consented to pool military and civilian capabilities under the CSDP umbrella, their adversity towards relinquishing sovereign authority towards the EU is easily observable. The member states' lack of commitment to deeper European integration, their distinct strategic cultures and interests, coupled with their unwillingness to increase defence spending are illustrative examples. Moreover, the absence of agreement on the actual purposes of a common security policy, and the states' preference for alternative frameworks for cooperation like NATO or ad-hoc 'coalitions of the willing' have led to inaction on numerous occasions, as in the recent cases of Mali and Libya. There is undoubtedly a difference between the catalysts for specific military operations under the CSDP and the incentives behind the emergence of the broader maritime security cooperation inside the EU; however, while elements of maritime security existed in different policy fields

long before the launch of military operations under the banner of the EU, an examination of the selected cases reveals the drivers which led member states to further *deepen* security cooperation in maritime affairs and to endow it with an explicit 'hard' component.

For an in-depth analysis of the case studies, I used process tracing, defined as follows: 'the cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step' (Van Evera, 1997, p. 64). A notable strength of this method is that it helps overcoming the small-*n* research limitations, by producing more theoretically relevant observations about the phenomenon under scrutiny (ibid.). Specifically, proof that a certain set of causal factors was responsible for a specific outcome can be found both in the 'sequence and structure of events and/or in the testimony of actors explaining why they acted as they did' (ibid., p. 65).

The first case study investigates the motivations behind the launch of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EU counter-piracy operation deployed in December 2008 to deter, prevent and disrupt piracy and armed robbery off the coasts of Somalia. Atalanta holds a special importance as the first ever EU-led naval operation, which signalled a decisive moment for the Union's security actorness in the maritime field. Furthermore, the operation represents a central component of the EU's response to a global security menace situated at a strategic distance from Europe.

Similarly, the second case examines the main driving factors leading to the decision to activate EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia in June 2015, a military operation mandated to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks in the Central Mediterranean. Operation Sophia constitutes a particularly relevant case to study. First, together with the EUMSS and operation Atalanta, it reaffirms the emergence of an increasingly prominent European maritime dimension under the CSDP. Second, with its robust mandate, it represents an unusually militarised reaction to irregular migration, which is generally placed at the 'soft' end of the security threat spectrum. Third, both cases constitute a promising area of research where complex configurations of power politics, economic interests, and norm-based motivations are at play.

As various scholars have already emphasised, the EU military and civilian operations were triggered by a diverse range of reasons, often including a mix of security, economic, and human rights considerations; external pressures from the US or the UN; the concern for

regional and global stability; as well as the desire to consolidate the credibility of the CSDP and to raise the profile of the EU as an international security provider (Hill, 2013; Merlingen, 2013; Haine and Giegerich, 2006; Keane, 2006). All the rationales enumerated above and still other may account for specific decisions at a given point in time; yet, establishing with more precision the predominance of a certain set of motivations; the convergence or, on the contrary, the conflict between two or more incentives for action; as well as the potential tensions which may arise between different actors regarding the *rational* or the *appropriate* course of action – provide together a more detailed account of new empirical cases and of the Union’s nature and role as a security actor. However, in practice, identifying a clear-cut separation between the normative sincerity of the EU and its strategic or rhetorical arguments is often challenging, if not downright impossible. (Schimmelfennig, 2001). To overcome this challenge, I proceeded to triangulate evidence from different data sources; to assess the consistency of the actors’ justifications across time, distinct member states and different EU institutional settings; and finally, to examine whether the actors’ words matched their actual deeds.

For gathering data, I primarily relied on documentary analysis, which involved examining the EU official documents from various policy fields: maritime affairs and fisheries, security and defence, migration, development and humanitarian aid – and to a lesser extent, transport, energy and environment. Sources mainly consisted of secondary legislation, including both binding instruments (regulations adopted by the Council and the European Parliament, or by the Commission; directives of the Council and the European Parliament; decisions of the Commission or the Council), as well as non-binding acts, such as Council resolutions and Commission communications. These sources were supplemented by the EU strategies in the maritime and security policy realms; while lacking legal effects, such documents represent nonetheless chief political statements which define the priorities of the maritime security policies of the Union, and establish a common framework for action for member states and EU institutions. Furthermore, I selectively used keynote speeches of high-ranking EU and national officials, as well as factsheets and studies published by various EU institutions. Additional sources, including reports of public hearings before national parliaments, press releases issued by ministries of foreign affairs and defence, as well as transcripts of official declarations provided detailed information about the member states’ specific contexts and

positions. To complement this data, I also drew on the existing academic literature on maritime security, CSDP operations, piracy, and irregular migration, as well as on the so-called 'grey literature' including NGO, think tank, industry, and independent expert reports and studies for factual background information.

For triangulation purposes, between November 2016 and March 2017, I conducted seven in-depth, semi-structured interviews with relevant officials at the Council of the EU, the EEAS, and NATO. These interviews were carried out under the Chatham House rule, reason for which I have kept my interviewees anonymous. Last but not least, debates during conferences and workshops have greatly facilitated my access to more sensitive or publicly unavailable information.

Several analytical and empirical *limitations* should be mentioned at this point.

A first limitation of the thesis stems from its main focus on the EU's militarised response to threats at sea, which may arguably appear in sharp contradiction to the comprehensive definition of maritime security outlined above. However, the purposely exclusion of non-military aspects should not be understood as a prompt dismissal of their importance and relevance for this analysis. The choice can be justified by different arguments. First of all, the security of the maritime domain cuts across a multitude of policies and issue-areas, which makes unfeasible the inclusion of all potentially relevant topics into a single study. Second, in spite of its empirical focus on the EU operations, the present work has not analysed the subject solely from a military perspective, but has captured instead the broader policy context in which the naval component is embedded, alongside other diplomatic, financial, legal, humanitarian and development instruments. Third, since the main objective of the thesis is to understand what prompted the member states' close security cooperation in maritime affairs – an area historically associated with entrenched sovereign prerogatives – it seems more useful to examine first what triggered change in the most sensitive fields such as the CSDP, rather than focusing on marginal, uncontroversial, or chiefly symbolic initiatives.

A second limitation of the thesis is related to its rather narrow focus on the role of EU institutions and individual member states in the Union's maritime security policy, while omitting the rising influence of private military actors, industry, think tanks, expert networks and civil society in the regional and global security architecture. In the maritime field, telling examples of such actors may include private maritime security companies (PMSC) fighting

pirates in the Horn and Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, and Southeast Asia; commercial vessels and NGOs conducting extensive search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean; specialised consultancy groups and think tanks advising policy makers on key maritime issues; or lobbying groups with a broad constellation of interests in marine environmental protection, resource exploitation, blue energy, and others. However, while acknowledging that such actors are important in the formulation and implementation of the Union`s maritime security policies, member countries remain the ultimate decision-makers in the field as the main repositories of sovereignty.

Finally, a third lacuna originates in the so-called ‘EU-centric’ bias, which has been repeatedly criticised for assuming in advance that the Union constitutes the unique or the most attractive venue for member states to formulate their policies, undertake action, or pursue their interests (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). In reality, states have at their disposal numerous other frameworks to choose from at the sub-regional, regional or global level, in between which they move according to the nature and scope of the policy issue at hand, the decision-making processes and participatory composition of these fora, the related political and legal constraints, and numerous other factors (De Witte and Thies, 2013). Nevertheless, precisely because these plausible options exist, the member states` decision to cooperate on maritime security issues within the EU appears even more startling and hence, merits further consideration.

The following two chapters (*Chapter 4* and *Chapter 5*) have applied the conceptual framework outlined above to two ‘hard cases’ of cooperation, namely the decisions to launch the two naval operations conducted so far by the EU: EUNAVFOR Atalanta fighting piracy off the coasts of Somalia, and EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia mandated to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling networks in the Central Mediterranean.

By choosing to focus on these cases, I have not suggested that other forms of security cooperation should be discarded as unimportant. However, I reason that the two selected examples represent suitable test cases for understanding the conditions under which member states agree to engage in joint action under the EU flag, because they necessarily involve the use of military force and capability deployment, which are inherently more controversial due to the high risks and costs involved. Differently put, if cooperation is possible in the military field, then it would also be likely to occur in other areas which are less contentious. In

addition, the cases illustrate the EU's response to distinct challenges which are of critical importance for the European security, and which are found in completely different geographical settings.

Several *empirical observations* can be drawn from a comparative examination of the two maritime operations. As expected, both cases revealed mixed results, implying that no single set of factors could adequately explain the emergence of cooperative responses in maritime security inside the EU framework. When assessing the influence of each category of factors on the member states' decision to conduct the operations, there are at least three striking similarities between the selected cases which can be noted.

First, evidence exists to support the realist hypothesis: through a process of issue-linkage, national and Brussels-based officials have often invoked concerns about organised crime and terrorism being closely interwoven with Somali piracy and irregular migration, respectively. Without dismissing the genuine fears of terrorism acutely felt by several member states, there was not enough evidence to support a clear link with terrorism in either instance. However, the alleged nexus between terrorism and piracy, on the one hand, and terrorism and irregular migration, on the other hand, played an important mobilising role and facilitated consensus formation on the initiation of the operations.

Second, normative considerations were also relevant, but only to a limited extent. Specifically, the moral imperative of saving and protecting human lives had a strong influence on the member states' initial decision to address together the issues of piracy and migration. However, in the actual implementation of the operations, member states failed to consistently adhere to the relevant legal and normative precepts, as their self-regarding, material interests often took precedence over humanitarian aspects.

Third, the need to protect the vital economic interests of individual member states or the more general interest of the EU represented by far the most powerful incentive for action. As a result, in the first case under scrutiny, the Union decided to dispatch warships off Somalia in order to defend the freedom of navigation on a vital shipping route, protect fisheries, and guarantee the safe transportation of energy resources, while in the second case, action was mainly prompted by the growing economic and logistic pressures of the continuous migratory arrivals. At a more general level, these findings support the claim that the EU is becoming a more prominent security actor in maritime security and world politics more broadly. The

gradual development of an EU maritime security dimension has enabled member states to collectively exert a stronger influence on their security environment, both in their immediate neighbourhood, as well as at strategic distances from the European continent.

From a *theoretical point of view*, the present research has contributed to the development of the nascent body of work on the EU maritime security under four major aspects.

First, the thesis has advanced its own working definition of maritime security, focusing on four main elements: the EU's active process of 'maritimisation'; the different referent objects secured through the maritime policies of the Union; the interests *and* norms informing the member states' behaviour; and finally, the comprehensive approach typically associated with the foreign and security policy of the EU.

Second, as previously shown, the research has added to the current debate on EU integration in the area of the CSDP, by speaking to the literature examining the drivers of this process.

Third, the study is also relevant in the context of the relation between norms and interests in the security policy of the EU – an old, yet persistently relevant discussion linked to the wider debate on the nature of the Union as an international actor.

Fourth and finally, the study sheds additional light on the corpus of knowledge on the EU and the emerging security challenges. Whilst one could argue that maritime piracy and migration represent special security threats (which would inevitably limit the generalizability of the findings), a contrary view may affirm instead that such challenges constitute the norm rather than the exception in today's security context. Piracy and irregular migration exemplify very well the current international environment, characterised by diverse and diffuse security threats, a proliferation of referent objects, and an intricate security architecture which includes a plurality of state and non-state actors.

In addition, the thesis has shown that the EU remained the member states' preferred venue for cooperation compared to other national or multilateral fora. As such, given the complex and costly nature of counter-piracy and counter-smuggling measures, undertaking joint actions inside the EU presented clear advantages in terms of scale and effectiveness. Moreover, the Union had at its disposal a richer palette of policy-tools and a more comprehensive approach to security, which made it better equipped to address the identified threats. In addition, the EU maintained a privileged relation with key African countries, seen

as indispensable partners in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean and irregular migration in the Mediterranean.

As a result, the EU is highly likely to remain the most relevant site of cooperation in maritime security under similar circumstances, and even more so in the present context in which the Union has asserted its global ambitions in a maritime domain plagued by countless dangers and risks, including not only piracy and irregular migration, but also territorial disputes, terrorism, trafficking, illegal fishing, environmental pollution, man-made and natural disasters, or the destruction of the maritime heritage.

At last, *Chapter 6* summarised the main findings of the thesis, as outlined above, and suggested four novel directions of study for future research on maritime security in the context of the EU.

A *first direction* stems from the need to pay increased attention to the broader developments in the regional and global security environment, and to move beyond the 'EU-centrism' that has long characterised EU studies (Laatikainen, 2013; Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez, 2015; Acharya, 2016). Absorbed by their object of study, European studies scholars have often been inclined to place the EU at the core of their research design, while omitting the interactions and interdependencies between member states and its outer environment. In this case, however, the global maritime context is crucial for shaping the EU's trajectory in international politics: the changing global maritime balance of power marked by the emergence or resurgence of a number of powers such as China, Russia, India and Brazil; the growing competition over marine resources and the increasing contestation of the global commons; the rising hybrid and non-state threats at sea; and the combined effects of climate change, extreme poverty, regional volatility, and maritime crime are just some of the numerous developments affecting the Union. In its immediate maritime neighbourhood, the Union is confronted with a diversity of security challenges, ranging from traditional threats, such as Russia's military build-up in the Black Sea, to emergent menaces including illegal immigration, trafficking and smuggling, maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean, and to overfishing and marine pollution in the Baltic Sea. Given the interconnected nature of the global maritime domain, the EU's security also depends on developments in more geographically distant regions covering vital maritime routes: in the south, the corridor connecting the Gulf of Suez through the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Straits; in the east, the

avenue continuing from the Malacca Straits to the East China Sea; and in the north, the highway including the Arctic sea routes. In these areas, the EU has to face a diversity of both distinct and cross-cutting challenges, ranging from piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden and the South China Sea; spill-over effects of regional insecurity, as in the case of the Persian Gulf crisis; great power conflict involving the US, China, Russia and India; unsolved territorial disputes, such as those existing in the Taiwan Strait, or those over various islands in the East China Sea; looming competition over energy resources in the Arctic; as well as overfishing, marine pollution, and climate change. Hence, as its maritime vicinity becomes more competitive and crowded, the Union has gradually expanded its range of security tasks in its neighbourhood by protecting critical shipping lanes and infrastructure; monitoring and controlling fishing fleets and commercial traffic; deterring and countering maritime non-state actors such as pirates, migrant smugglers, and other criminal networks; maintaining close partnerships and multilateral dialogues with key countries in the area; and undertaking active efforts to promote regional stability and security, build maritime capacities, support development, and provide humanitarian aid.

A *second* area which merits further attention includes the EU's security policies beyond the relatively narrow scope of the initiatives adopted under the CSDP label. As shown, the Union pursues its security goals in the maritime realm through a wide-range of policies and instruments, including political dialogue, capacity building, humanitarian assistance, and development aid. As such, a comparative analysis of cooperation across distinct policy areas under different competences regimes would provide a more complete picture of the EU's role as a security actor in maritime affairs. Future work could examine, for instance, to which extent and in which ways the factors underpinning maritime security cooperation within the EU change from one policy field to another; the varying role of national and European actors; or the differences in the nature and scope of the 'maritimisation' process.

Third, this study has shown how the EU has shifted from 'sea blindness' to an increasingly assertive military role in maritime security. Yet, as previously mentioned, maritime security defined in a comprehensive manner, i.e. as referring to economic, environmental, transport, or societal security, has much deeper roots in the European construction. Thorough longitudinal studies tracing the development of cooperation on different aspects of maritime security over time would fill in this remaining gap.

Finally, a *fourth* direction of study is determined by the increasingly important role of various non-state actors in the EU security policymaking. In the maritime sphere, such actors may include, for instance, supranational EU institutions, EU bodies and decentralised agencies, private security providers, human rights NGOs, think tanks, expert networks, or research institutes. These stakeholders may become involved in agenda-setting through advocacy and awareness raising (e.g. the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre publishes and disseminates regular reports on piracy, armed robbery and stowaway incidents); may assist national authorities in conducting security and humanitarian tasks (e.g., Frontex provides support for monitoring and protecting the EU's external borders); may perform various activities in parallel with member states (such as numerous NGOs and private shipmasters conducting SAR operations in the Mediterranean); or may be privately contracted by national governments to ensure different services such as site security, operational support, training, risk consulting and intelligence gathering. In this light, studies of EU's cooperation with non-state actors in the ambit of maritime security would represent an important contribution to the literature on security governance, as well as to the works examining non-state actor participation in international organisations and in the specific context of the CSDP.

Moreover, additional theories can shed light on previously unexplored aspects. For instance, in the rationalist camp, new studies might explore the insights revealed by neoclassical realism – which would facilitate a more fine-grained examination of EU security cooperation by introducing domestic-level variables, or might turn instead to sociological institutionalism and socialisation to analyse the influence of norms, values and identity on the EU institutional set-up and functioning in maritime security from a constructivist approach. Alternatively, critical theory and postmodern studies may also provide other fruitful avenues of research.

Considering the observations above and the complexity of the topic, rather than representing a definitive work, this thesis should only be seen as a preliminary step towards future contributions to the empirical and theoretical analysis of the emerging EU maritime security policy.

References

- Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1), pp. 3-32.
- Acharya, A. 2016. Regionalism beyond EU-centrism. In: Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109-132.
- Adler, E. 2013. Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates. In: Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B. A. (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*. Second edition. London: SAGE, pp. 112-144.
- Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* 53(4), pp. 699-732.
- Bauer, P. 2015a. *Arab Spring Challenges for Democracy and Security in the Mediterranean*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bauer, P. 2015b. The European Mediterranean Policy after the Arab Spring: Beyond Values and Interests. *Middle East Critique* 24(1), pp. 27-40.
- Belt, D., Chapsos, I. and Samardžić, D. 2013. Maritime Security Challenges in South East Europe. In: Cross, S. et. al (eds.) *Shaping South East Europe's Security Community for the Twenty-First Century: Trust, Partnership, Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 134-150.
- Bicchi, F. 2002. *From security to economy and back? Euro-Mediterranean relations in perspective*. Florence: European University Institute.
- Brandt, W. 2006. Does the EU constitute a 'Maritime Superpower?' In: Ehlers, P. and Lagoni, R. (eds.) *International Maritime Organizations and their Contribution towards a Sustainable Marine Development*. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, pp. 259-284.
- Bredima-Savopoulou, A. 1990. *The common shipping policy of the EC*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Brennan, G. et al. 2013. *Explaining Norms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. 2008. The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: the Case of External Fisheries Policy. *European Integration* 30(3), pp. 401-417.
- Bull, H. 1982. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(2), pp. 149-170.
- Cardwell, P. J. 2009. *EU External Relations and Systems of Governance: the CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Chilton, P. 1995. Common, Collective, or Combined? Theories of Defence Integration in the European Union. In: Rhodes, C. and Mazey, S. (eds.) *The State of the European Union: Building a European Polity?* Vol.3. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 81-110.
- Christodoulou-Varotsi, I. 2009. *Maritime Safety Law and Policies of the European Union and the United States: Antagonism or Synergy?* Heidelberg: Springer.
- Churchill, R. and Owen, D. 2010. *The origins and development of the Common Fisheries Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Council of the European Union. 2014. *European Union Maritime Security Strategy*. 11205/14, 24 June 2014.
- Cugusi, B. and Stocchiero, A. 2016. The European Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region. In: Gänzle, S. and Kern, K. (eds.) *A 'Macro-regional' Europe in the Making*:

- Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169- 188.
- Danson, M. 2016. A North Sea Macro-region? Partnerships, Networking and Macro-regional Dimensions. In: Gänzle, S. and Kern, K. (eds.) *A 'Macro-regional' Europe in the Making: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215- 242.
- De Witte, B. and Thies, A. 2013. Why choose Europe? The Place of the European Union in the Architecture of International Legal Cooperation. In: Van Vooren, B., Blockmans, S. and Wouters, J. (eds.) *The EU's Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23- 38.
- Delarue, R. 2013. The EU-ILO Partnership and the Global Identity of the Union's Social Model. In: de Waele, H. and Kuipers, J. (eds.) *The European Union's Emerging International Identity: Views from the Global Arena*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 131-158.
- Duchâtel, M. and Huijskens, F. 2015. The European Union's principles neutrality on the East China Sea. *SIPRI Policy Brief*, February 2015. Solna: SIPRI.
- Duchêne, F. 1972. Europe's role in world peace. In: Mayne R (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. London: Fontana, pp. 32-47.
- Duchêne, F. 1973. The European community and the uncertainties of interdependence. In: Kohnstamm, M. and Hager, W. (eds.) *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 1-21.
- Elgstrom, O. and Smith, M. (eds.) 2006. *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2016a. *International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of our oceans*. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. JOIN (2016)49 final, 10.11.2016.
- European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2016b. *An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic*. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. JOIN (2016)21 final, 27.4.2016.
- European External Action Service. 2016. *CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies*. Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en [Accessed: 3 January 2017].
- European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 2016. *Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard*. OJEU L 251/1 of 16.9.2016.
- Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization* 52(3), pp. 887-917.
- Fischer, S. 2010. The European Union and security in the Black Sea region after the Georgia crisis. In: Triantaphyllou, D. (ed.) *The Security Context in the Black Sea Region*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 111-129.
- Frank, V. 2007. *The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection in the International Law of the Sea: Implementing Global Obligations at the Regional Level*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- George, A. L. and Bennett, A. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

- Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Gilek, M. and Kern, K. (eds.) 2016. *Governing Europe's Marine Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU Policies?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gomez, R. 1998. The EU's Mediterranean policy: Common foreign policy by the back door? In: Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds.) *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*. New York: Routledge, pp. 135-152.
- Haine, J.Y. and Giegerich, B. 2006. In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation. *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2006. Retrieved from: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12iht-edhaine.1954062.html> [Accessed: 16 May 2016].
- Hill, C. 2013. *The National Interest in Question: Foreign Policy in Multicultural Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. T. 2003. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. In: Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. T. (eds.) *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3-24.
- Hyde-Price, A. 2012. Neorealism: A Structural Approach to CSDP. In: Kurowska, X. and Breuer, F. (eds.) *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 16-40.
- Kaldor, M. 2012. The EU as a New Form of Political Authority: The Example of the Common Security and Defence Policy. *Global Policy* 3(1), pp. 79- 86.
- Kaunert, C. and Zwolski, K. 2014. Somalia versus Captain 'Hook': assessing the EU's security actorness in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 27(3), pp. 593-612.
- Keane, R. 2006. EU Foreign Policy Motivation: A Mix of Human Security and Realist Elements. In: MacLean, S. J., Black, D. R. and Shaw, T. M. (eds.) *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralism*. Hampshire, England: Ashgate, pp. 39-52.
- Keohane, R. O and Nye, J. S. 2012. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Fourth Edition. Boston: Longman.
- Keukeleire, S. and Delreux, T. 2014. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Second edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Knutsen, B. and Dønjar, E. 2016. Building a comprehensive approach 'bottom-up': A systematic comparison of the EU's, the US's and NATO's strategies for providing security to the Horn of Africa. In: Peters, I. (ed.) *The European Union's Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Beyond the "Actorness and Power" Debate*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 207-227.
- Koutrakos, P. and Skordas, A. 2014. *The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives*. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 81-166.
- Kurowska, X. 2012. Introduction: The Role of Theory in Research on Common Security and Defence Policy. In: Kurowska, X. and Breuer, F. (eds.) *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-15.
- Laatikainen, K. V. 2013. EU multilateralism in a multipolar world. In: Jørgensen, K. E. and Laatikainen, K. V. (eds.) *Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 472-487.
- Larivé, M. H. 2014. *Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity*. New York: Routledge.
- Lequesne, C. 2004. *The Politics of Fisheries in the European Union*. Manchester: Manchester

- University Press.
- Lesquesne, C. 1999. Quand l'Union européenne gouverne les poissons: pourquoi une politique commune de la pêche? *Les études du CERI* 61, December 1999. Paris: Science Po-CERI, pp. 1-36.
- Mälksoo, M. 2006. From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe. *Security Dialogue* 37(3), pp. 275–297.
- Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2), pp. 235–258.
- Manners, I. 2009. The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics. In: Gerrits, A. (ed.) *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*. Clingendael European Papers No. 5, December 2009, pp. 9-24.
- March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Merlingen, M. 2012. *EU Security Policy: What It Is, How It Works, Why It Matters*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Merlingen, M. 2013. The CSDP in the Western Balkans: From experimental pilot to security governance. In: Biscop, S. and Whitman, R. (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 145- 158.
- Metzger, J. and Schmitt, P. 2012. When soft spaces harden: the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. *Environment and Planning* 44(2), pp. 263-280.
- Moravcsik, A. 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4), pp. 473-524.
- Moravcsik, A. 1998. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Nițoiu, C. 2012. Normative of EU Foreign Policy in the Black Sea Region. In: Ivan, R. (ed.) *New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging Regionalism in the Black Sea Area*. Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 95-110.
- Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. 2015. The Governance of European Defence. In: Jørgensen, K. E. et al. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, Volume I. London: SAGE, pp. 251-263.
- Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pallis, A. 2002. *The common EU maritime transport policy: policy Europeanization in the 1990s*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Pape, M. 2016. *The IMO: for safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans*. European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing February 2016, PE 577.964. Brussels: European Parliament.
- Parsons, S. 2005. *Rational Choice and Politics: A Critical Introduction*. London: Continuum.
- Penas Lado, E. 2016. *The Common Fisheries Policy: The Quest for Sustainability*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.
- Pollack, M. 2001. International Relations Theory and European integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(2), pp. 221-244.
- Pollack, M. 2006. Rational choice and EU Politics. In: Jørgensen, K., Pollack, M. and Rosamond, B. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of European Union Politics*. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 31-56.
- Pollack, M. A. 2012. Realist, Intergovernmentalist and Institutionalist Approaches. In: Jones,

- E., Menon, A. and Weatherill, S. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-17.
- Riddervold, M. 2011. Finally flexing its muscles? Atalanta: The European Union's naval military operation against piracy. *European Security* 20(3), pp. 385- 404.
- Riddervold, M. and Sjørnsen, H. 2012. Playing into the Hands of the Commission? The Case of EU Coordination in the ILO. In: Costa, O. and Jørgensen, K. (eds.) *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU: When Multilateralism Hits Brussels*. Basingstoke: Routledge, pp. 42-57.
- Rodt, A, P. 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Rogers, J. 2013. European (British and French) geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 9(1), pp. 69-89.
- Rumford, C. and Buhari-Gulmez, D. 2015. The world society turn in European studies. In: Magone, J. M. (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of European Politics*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 910-926.
- Schimmelfennig, F. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization* 55(1), pp. 47-80.
- Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. 2002. Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(4), pp. 500-528.
- Sicurelli, D. 2016. *The European Union`s Africa Policies: Norms, Interests and Impact*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Sjørnsen, H. 2003. Understanding the common foreign and security policy: Analytical building blocks. In: Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds.) *Understanding the European Union`s External Relations*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 34-52.
- Sjørnsen, H. 2006. The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be? *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2), pp. 235-251.
- Stake, R. 2005. Qualitative Case Studies. In: Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Third edition. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, pp. 443-466.
- Steward, E. J. 2006. *The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy Evolution and Outcome*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Tallberg, J. 2003. *European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply*. London: Routledge.
- Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Consolidated version of 2012. OJEU C326/47 of 26 .10. 2012.
- van der Putten, F. P, Wetzling, T. and Kamerling, S. 2014. *Geopolitics and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: What Role for the European Union?* Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations and The Hague Institute for Global Justice Policy Brief, August 2014. Retrieved from: <https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Geopolitics%20and%20Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf> [Accessed: 9 May 2017].
- Van Evera, S. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Wakefield, J. 2016. *Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Walt, S. 1998. International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110, Spring

1998, pp. 29-46.

Waltz, K. N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, S. 2012. *The Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union's Internal Security*.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zehfuss, M. 2002. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.